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American legal scholars spend a large proportion of their time 
debating and theorizing procedure.  This Article focuses on American 
proceduralism in the particular field of civil justice and undertakes a 
detailed comparison with England, where procedural questions receive 
little academic attention.  It finds that procedure is more prominent in 
America partly because Americans have been more willing than others to 
use private litigation as a tool for regulation.  More significantly, 
procedural questions necessarily occupy more space in American debates 
because authority over civil justice is unusually dispersed among different 
actors; procedural rules allocate power among these actors.  But American 
proceduralism runs deeper than these surface explanations allow, and a 
full account requires an examination of the history of American legal 
thought.  I trace contemporary American proceduralism to a counter-
intuitive source—the emergence of Legal Realism in the 1920s and 1930s. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In law, procedure matters.  From the very start of law school, 
students learn that many of the most important questions about 
law and justice are procedural.  In first-year civil procedure 
courses, students consider questions such as: which court has the 
power to hear the plaintiff’s claim?  What does a plaintiff have to 
plead to survive a motion to dismiss?  Will a jury or judge decide 
the case?  Criminal law courses often include a large criminal 
procedure component; regardless, everyone knows how important 
procedural issues are in criminal justice.  American law students 
quickly understand, if they don’t know already, that procedural 
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rules are often just as important as the substantive law governing 
the plaintiff’s claim or the prosecution’s case. 
Procedural questions are important in any legal system, but 
they often dominate legal debates in the United States to a 
puzzling extent.  As Robert Kagan says, “[c]ompared to other 
economically advanced democracies, American civil life is more 
deeply pervaded by conflict and by controversy about legal 
processes.”1  Regardless of the content of their views on procedure, 
Americans consider procedural issues to be centrally important.  In 
the depth of their absorption with procedural questions, American 
lawyers and legal scholars appear to diverge from many of their 
foreign counterparts.  The aim of this Article is to figure out why. 
Post-9/11 litigation by alleged enemy combatants detained in 
Guantanamo and elsewhere provides a vivid example of 
proceduralism in action.  The plaintiffs in these cases asserted 
dramatic violations of their substantive rights to be free from 
illegal detention and torture.  The central questions raised by war-
on-terror litigation surely concern the factual and legal validity of 
these claims.  But, writing more than six years after the September 
11, 2001 attacks, Jenny Martinez demonstrated that most of the U.S. 
court decisions in detainee litigation were fixated on questions of 
process: whether the federal courts had the power to hear the 
dispute, which federal district was the proper venue, whether the 
correct branch of the federal government had taken the necessary 
decision, whether particular plaintiffs had standing, whether 
evidence was protected from discovery by the state secrets 
privilege, and so on.2  (Not much has changed since then.3)  
                                                     
1 ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 
(2001). 
2 See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War On Terror,” 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (2008). 
3 The Supreme Court has continued to focus on procedural issues in war-on-
terror cases since Martinez’s article.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 
Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 352, 391 (2010) (examining the “noteworthy disparity” between the 
Supreme Court’s “assertiveness in upholding judicial jurisdiction” and “its 
reticence regarding substantive rights”); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive 
Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122, 125 (2011) (“Although the Justices have 
repeatedly acted to assert and preserve the institutional role of the federal courts 
more generally, they have been decidedly unwilling to engage the substance of 
counterterrorism policies, especially in cases in which those policies relate to 
alleged abuses of individual civil liberties.”). 
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Martinez contrasted the greater propensity of British4 and Israeli 
courts to reach the merits in war-on-terror cases and suggested that 
“there is something particular about American legal culture at this 
moment in time” that provides at least part of the explanation for 
that concentration on procedural issues.5 
This “something particular” about American legal culture is the 
focus of this Article.  I aim to make two main contributions to the 
limited literature on the distinctively proceduralist tilt of American 
legal education and scholarship.6  First, I establish and explain this 
form of American exceptionalism in the particular field of civil 
justice.7  In America, civil procedure is at the core of the first-year 
curriculum and plays host to a wide array of sophisticated 
scholarly approaches; American scholars intellectualize legal 
procedure to an unusual degree.  Here, as elsewhere in the Article, 
I sharpen our understanding of America by comparing it to its 
close cousin: England.8  In marked contrast to the American 
position, few scholars in England focus their work on civil 
procedure, and most students pass through their law degrees 
                                                     
4 For more on the British judicial response, see John Ip, The Supreme Court and 
House of Lords in the War on Terror, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1 (2011) (considering the 
implications for individual liberties of decisions by the United States Supreme 
Court and the United Kingdom’s House of Lords in war-on-terror litigation). 
5 Martinez, supra note 2, at 1016; see also id. at 1078 (“[J]urists in many other 
nations simply do not share the American academic fascination with process and 
skepticism of rights-based arguments.”). 
6 Aside from Martinez, supra note 2, surprisingly few scholars have written 
generally on the reasons for the proceduralist bent of American legal culture.  As 
discussed in Section 3.2, infra, previous work on Anglo-American comparative 
civil procedure by Benjamin Kaplan and Masayuki Tamaruya has noticed that 
procedural questions seem to inspire more debate in American civil justice than in 
its English equivalent.  See Benjamin Kaplan, An American Lawyer in the Queen’s 
Courts: Impressions of English Civil Procedure, 69 MICH. L. REV. 821, 844 (1971) 
(noting that “strife” over reforms of court procedure was “far less intense in 
England than in the United States”); Masayuki Tamaruya, The Anglo-American 
Perspective on Freezing Injunctions, 29 CIV. JUST. Q. 350, 363 (2010) (noting that 
“politics does not appear to play a significant role” in English civil procedure, 
whereas American civil procedure is “overtly political”). 
7 By “civil justice,” I mean simply civil litigation (in public law and private 
law).  See Jason M. Solomon, What Is Civil Justice?, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 321–24 
(2010) (distinguishing among different uses of the phrase “civil justice” in 
academic and popular discourse). 
8 Martinez conjectures that the legal systems of other nations are less 
proceduralist than the United States, but says that a comparative study of the 
relationship between substantive and procedural law is beyond the scope of her 
article.  See Martinez, supra note 2, at 1078. 
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without giving it much thought.  Proceduralism in civil justice, 
therefore, is not synonomous with the common-law tradition.  
Given their shared substantive and procedural heritage, the 
divergence between England and the United States is remarkable, 
and cries out for explanation. 
Second, I provide a two-level account of the origins and 
circumstances of contemporary American proceduralism.  At one 
level, I tie the high degree of salience that procedural questions 
have in American civil justice to distinctive features of civil 
litigation: Americans simply do more with civil litigation, and 
authority over civil justice is divided among varied actors.  More 
fundamentally, I contend that American proceduralism is closely 
related to the history of American legal thought, in general, and to 
the rise of Legal Realism, in particular.  The more obvious place to 
seek the origins of American proceduralism is the Legal Process 
movement that flourished in the 1940s and 1950s.9  But we gain a 
deeper understanding of the character of American proceduralism 
by looking back further, to the Legal Realists.  I show that, as part 
of their embrace of an instrumental approach to legal justification, 
and their skepticism about the determinacy of substantive law, the 
Realists themselves called attention to the significance of procedure.  
Their work then provoked a proceduralist response in the shape of 
Legal Process thought.  Through the intellectual descendants of the 
Realists and Legal Process theorists, the strongly proceduralist 
element in American legal thought lives on today. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  I begin in Section 2 with some 
analytical work, explaining precisely what I mean by 
proceduralism.  In so doing, I canvass much of the existing 
scholarship on the substance-procedure relationship.  In Section 3, 
I survey contemporary legal education and scholarship and show 
the centrality of procedure to American legal culture in the field of 
civil justice, contrasting it with English legal culture.  In Section 4, I 
explore a partial explanation for the difference: American lawyers 
consider procedure more consequential in civil justice because 
procedure simply is more consequential in American civil justice.  I 
give two sets of reasons.  First, procedure is more important in 
                                                     
9 See Martinez, supra note 2, at 1064 (“Despite years of criticism of the 
limitations and shortcomings of Legal Process methodology, there is enduring 
(and not entirely unwarranted) appeal in the promise that if we can just figure out 
a good process for making decisions, the hard policy questions of the time will be 
resolved correctly.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
03_MACMAHON-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/6/2013  7:56 PM 
550 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:3 
 
American civil justice because Americans place more faith in civil 
litigation, relying on private parties as agents of regulation, where 
other legal systems choose a government-led solution or leave the 
social problem to market or social pressure.10  So the stakes in 
American civil justice are higher than elsewhere, and the peculiarly 
American reliance on litigation has spawned procedural 
innovations like class actions and large punitive damages.  These 
developments give American procedure scholars more to write 
about and American students more to learn.  Second, adjudicative 
power over civil justice in America is distinctively fragmented 
among different actors—between federal courts and state courts 
and between judge and jury.11  Procedural law is so significant in 
America partly because it polices the boundaries between these 
various actors.  I support these contentions by again focusing on 
the American-English contrast.  In England, power over civil 
justice is reposed mainly in a single, relatively homogeneous, set of 
judges.  The English legal system’s essentially unitary character 
and the near-extinction of its civil jury are crucial factors in the 
continued dominance of substance over procedure in England. 
While these distinguishing features of American civil justice are 
a vital part of the story, I believe they do not alone explain the full 
extent of American proceduralism.  Accordingly, Section 5 
explores deeper reasons, reasons that lie in the history of legal 
thought.  Looking to the intellectual history of American law, I find 
the roots of contemporary proceduralism in the emergence of 
Legal Realism in the 1920s and 1930s.  The Legal Realists fomented 
skepticism about substantive law, gaining near-universal 
acceptance for Llewellyn’s dictum that “law in the books” (in 
essence, substantive law) often differs fundamentally from “law in 
action” (affected by procedure).  The more one sees law as a means 
of achieving economic or political goals, as American lawyers and 
legal theorists typically do, the more important procedure becomes 
in assessing the law’s actual contribution to those goals.  The 
Realists did not just talk about procedure (though they certainly 
did that); one of their number, Charles E. Clark, was the principal 
architect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Thereafter, the 
response of Legal Process theorists to the Realist attack on the 
                                                     
10 See Section 4.1, infra. 
11 See Section 4.2, infra (discussing the fragmentation of power in the civil 
justice system). 
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coherence of substantive law was to seek agreement on procedural 
solutions, thus assuring the special significance of procedure in the 
way Americans think about law.  An understanding of the 
importance of procedure is now almost unanimous among 
American lawyers. 
Again, I reinforce my argument by focusing on the English 
comparison.  At the end of the nineteenth century, Anglo-
American lawyers shared a belief in the primacy of substantive 
law.  The English, however, retained this belief, while procedure 
grew in importance for the American legal academy.  Unlike the 
United States, England never had a Realist revolution, and the 
English still place less weight on procedural questions in civil 
justice.  This, I suggest, is no coincidence.  My comparative law 
case for the connection between Realism and proceduralism is 
strengthened by analysis of a 1932 article by a leading Realist, 
Thurman Arnold.12  As Arnold and his colleagues attacked 
previous understandings of the substance-procedure distinction, 
Arnold looked across the Atlantic to find that substantive law 
retained its privileged position.  Arnold was describing a 
transatlantic divergence that remains eighty years later. 
In short, the Article links two intuitions that commonly strike 
people who, like me, have come to the American legal system from 
another: (i) that American legal culture is deeply affected by Legal 
Realism, and (ii) that Americans are exceptionally interested in 
procedure.  The argument is not a simplistic one that Legal Realism 
“caused” American proceduralism; I suggest the possibility of 
mutual causation between these two crucial aspects of American 
legal life. 
2. PROCEDURALISM 
Legal scholars frequently use the word “proceduralism,” and 
the corresponding word “proceduralist.”13  Proceduralism, 
whatever it may be, has received plenty of attention in criminal 
                                                     
12 See Thurman Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal 
Process, 45 HARV. L. REV. 617, 643 (1932). 
13 The word “proceduralist” is used mainly as a noun (usually to denote a 
person who espouses proceduralism), but also sometimes as an adjective (to 
describe an institution or argument that partakes of proceduralism).  
“Proceduralistic” also makes an occasional appearance in the law reviews. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
03_MACMAHON-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/6/2013  7:56 PM 
552 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:3 
 
law,14 constitutional theory,15 the legislative process,16 political 
philosophy,17 legal theory,18 bankruptcy law,19 corporate law,20 
                                                     
14 As I discuss further in note 60, infra, Bill Stuntz provides a detailed 
description and critique of proceduralism in criminal justice.  See WILLIAM J. 
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 196–242 (2011); William J. 
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 781 
(2006) (arguing that “constitutional proceduralism” during the 1960s and 1970s 
backfired and led to a harsher criminal justice system); William J. Stuntz, 
Substance, Procedure, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1 
(1996) (examining the intersection of two lines in constitutional law: “the line that 
separates criminal from civil, and the line between substance and process”); 
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 74–76 (1997) (arguing for a doctrine-by-doctrine 
examination of the law of criminal procedure to determine whether the costs of 
procedures are worthwhile).  For further criticisms of “proceduralism” in criminal 
law, see Developments in the Law: The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1114, 
1158–63 (2008) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s “proceduralism” in cases 
involving mental capacity determinations); Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing 
Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case Of Alford and 
Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1363 (2003) (challenging “the 
proceduralist approach to criminal procedure”). 
15 Most theoretical attempts to justify the American practice of judicial review 
of legislation may be characterized as proceduralist.  See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (providing a 
“representation-reinforcing” account by leading exemplar John Hart Ely, which 
has been described by both critics and allies as involving proceduralism);  see also 
Michael C. Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1237, 
1268 (2005) (stating that Ely “espouses proceduralism” and “goes so far as to 
suggest that it is in the very nature of a constitution to create a procedural 
framework rather than to resolve substantive issues”); Lawrence H. Tribe, The 
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 
(1980) (criticizing Ely on the ground that “[t]he process theme by itself determines 
almost nothing unless its presuppositions are specified, and its content 
supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and values”).  Cf. Frank I. 
Michelman, The Not So Puzzling Persistence of the Futile Search: Tribe on 
Proceduralism in Constitutional Theory, 42 TULSA L. REV. 891, 891 (2007) (describing 
the “proceduralistic turn” in liberal thought about how to justify judicial review 
of legislative action). 
16 See Jeremy Waldron, Principles of Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED 
BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 15, 31 (Richard 
W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (defending scholarship that focuses on the 
rules governing the legislative process against charges of “mindless 
proceduralism”). 
17 For example, the work of John Rawls has been characterized as 
“proceduralist,” partly because of Rawls’s assertion that the subject-matter for a 
theory of justice is the basic structure of society, and partly because Rawls uses 
the procedural device of agreement behind a veil of ignorance as a justificatory 
strategy.  See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).  See also Michelman, supra note 15, at 102; cf. 
Joshua Cohen, Pluralism and Proceduralism, 69 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 589, 616–18 (1994) 
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administrative law,21 employment law,22 the law of public 
schools,23 and election law.24  Whether they simply identify 
proceduralism, consider themselves proceduralists, or diagnose 
proceduralism as a malady, scholars rarely attempt to define these 
terms.  Clarifying, or at least stipulating, the meaning of 
                                                                                                                        
(examining the relationship between procedure and substance in political 
philosophy and arguing that Rawls has a substantive conception of justice). 
18 Debates over the concept of “rule of law” often center on the contrast 
between proceduralist views and substantive views.  See, e.g., Daniel B. 
Rodriguez, Mathew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, The Rule of Law 
Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1455, 1469–71 (2010) (contrasting the “substantive” 
conceptions of the rule of law held by Hayek, Rawls, and Dworkin with Raz’s 
“proceduralist” account). 
19 See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 
576–77 (1998) (dividing bankruptcy law scholars into “traditionalists” and 
“proceduralists”); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: 
Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 931 (2004) 
(defending “proceduralism” as an account of U.S. bankruptcy law). 
20 Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder 
Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 172 (1997) 
(arguing that procedural protections for shareholders against director self-interest 
are inadequate). 
21 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist 
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1341 (2006) (referring to the 
“proceduralism that dominates post-APA legal thinking in administrative law”); 
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. 
REV. 201, 230 (criticizing the “simple promotion of proceduralism” by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in United States v. Mead); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 
233 (1992) (contending that “[t]he APA is a prominent example of the dialectical 
relationship between expertise theory and proceduralism” and that “[a] declining 
faith in the ability of experts” led to “a re-emergence of proceduralism.”). 
22 See Paul M. Secunda, Labor and Employment Law, 64 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
203, 204 (2010) (reviewing CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM 
SELF-REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION (2010)) (defining as “proceduralist” an 
“approach that emphasizes the existence of procedural devices to mitigate 
employer unfairness in the workplace” and describing Estlund’s argument as 
proceduralist). 
23 See Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in 
Special Education Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415 (2011) (examining proceduralism 
in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); David L. Kirp, Proceduralism 
and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841 (1976) 
(considering the power and pitfalls of procedural protections as a means of 
curbing arbitrary behavior by public school officials). 
24 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Electoral Dispute Resolution: The Need for a New 
Sub-Specialty, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 286 (2012) (proposing a new 
scholarly field named “Democratic Proceduralism” that “ambitiously attempts to 
develop new and better procedures for operating a democratic society”). 
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proceduralism is a crucial preliminary step in my argument that 
proceduralism is a defining feature of American civil justice.  I ask 
first: what is procedure?  Then, I ask: what kind of orientation 
towards procedure counts as proceduralism? 
2.1. Procedure and Substantive Law 
American lawyers are “brought up on sophisticated talk about 
the fluidity of the line between substance and procedure.”25  Yet 
there is rough agreement on what counts as procedure and what 
counts as substantive law, however poorly theorized that 
agreement may be.26  While it may be difficult to tell whether a 
particular rule is procedural or substantive, the existence of 
troublesome borderline cases does not make the distinction 
meaningless.  Mostly, the difference is intuitively obvious.  In 
criminal law, for example, the definition of an offense is a matter of 
substantive law.  In the tort of negligence, the elements of the 
plaintiff’s cause of action—duty, breach, causation, and damage—
are matters of substantive law.  But the rule that the prosecution 
must prove the elements of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt is a rule of procedure, and so is the (general) civil rule that 
the plaintiff must establish the elements of a cause of action by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Rules about the proper forum for 
litigation are procedural, and so are rules about jury selection.  
Also procedural are the rules about the kinds of evidence the 
parties may offer to the court. 
A procedure is a way of doing something.  In law, procedure is 
a way of “doing” substantive law.27  Substantive law is the body of 
                                                     
25 John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724 
(1974).  See also Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 192 
(2004) (describing the procedure-substance distinction as “a tough nut to crack”).  
A recent remark by Joseph Blocher is representative of the prevailing academic 
attitude toward the procedure-substance distinction.  Blocher employs the terms 
“substantive” and “procedural,” while “knowing that the distinction between 
substantive and procedural rights is blurry at best.”  Joseph Blocher, Rights To and 
Not To, 100 CAL. L. REV. 761, 765 n.20 (2012). 
26 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
1733, 1735–36 (1995) (“Participants in legal controversies try to produce 
incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes.  They agree on the 
result and on relatively narrow or low-level explanations for it.  They need not 
agree on fundamental principle.  They do not offer larger or more abstract 
explanations than are necessary to decide the case.”) (citations omitted). 
27 See Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 801, 810 (2010) (“[S]ubstance and procedure . . . are not only counter-
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rules that purports to guide people’s conduct outside litigation and 
the lawmaking process.28  In litigation, we need answers to two 
questions: what is the law that governs the parties’ relations outside 
of litigation?  And how do courts resolve disputes about what that 
law means for the parties in particular cases?  Substantive law is an 
answer to the “what” question; procedure is an answer to the 
“how” question.  This “what-how” distinction tallies with the 
difference in constitutional law between “procedural due process” 
and “substantive due process.”29  Substantive due process30—an 
oxymoron, perhaps31—prevents government actors from depriving 
persons of certain interests, no matter how they do it.  Procedural 
due process doctrine regulates only how government may deprive 
a person of life, liberty, or property.  Similarly, in administrative 
law, when exercising “procedural review,” a court may review how 
the agency reached its decision; review of the merits of the decision 
itself is “substantive review.”32 
                                                                                                                        
terms or antonyms, but are also paradoxically yoked: each is extraordinarily 
difficult to define without also defining the other.”) (citations omitted). 
28 This view of substantive law reflects Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Hanna 
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474–77 (1965).  For similar views, see Martinez, supra note 
2, at 1020–21; Solum, supra note 25, at 192–225; Thomas W. Merrill, The Common 
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 n.200 (1985).  See also S.A. 
Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(Posner, J.) (the aim of a legal rule is “substantive” when it is “designed to shape 
conduct outside the courtroom and not just improve the accuracy or lower the 
cost of the judicial process”). 
29 See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 
120 YALE L.J. 408, 417–19 (2011) (“[T]he distinction between adjudication-related 
conduct and non-adjudication-related conduct is sufficiently distinct to serve as a 
useful dividing line for distinguishing between substantive and procedural 
rights.”) (citation omitted). 
30 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (“The Due Process 
Clause guarantees more than fair process . . . .”). 
31 See Mays v. City of East St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (remarking that “‘substantive due process’ is an oxymoron”).  
Critics of substantive due process delight in pointing out the difficulties of 
squaring this body of doctrine with the text of the Clauses.  See, e.g., John 
Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 493 
(1997) (likening a “reader of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process cases” 
to a “moviegoer who arrived late and missed a crucial bit of exposition”); ELY, 
supra note 15, at 18 (“[W]e apparently need periodic reminding that ‘substantive 
due process’ is a contradiction in terms—sort of like ‘green, pastel redness.’”). 
32 Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance 
Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2012). 
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Much of the agony over the substance-procedure distinction 
flows from the Erie case.33  The Erie doctrine is not only “the most 
studied principle in American law,”34 but also the central platform 
for discussing the procedure/substance distinction.35  Before Erie, 
when federal district courts exercising their diversity-of-citizenship 
jurisdiction adjudicated a common-law cause of action, such as a 
claim in contract or tort, they usually applied their own brand of 
common law, “federal common law.”36  But after Erie, “there is no 
general federal common law” because, as the Supreme Court 
decided, the federal courts lack constitutional authority to declare 
                                                     
33 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The literature on Erie and 
subsequent cases is enormous and inconclusive.  See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, The 
Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987 (2011); Robert J. 
Condlin, “A Formstone of Our Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna Doctrine & Casebook Law 
Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 525 (2005); Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George 
Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent 
Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707 (2006); Ely, supra note 25; Henry J. Friendly, In 
Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964); 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
489 (1954); Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 
89 WASH. U. L. REV. 103 (2011); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: 
Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-
Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963 (1998); Solum, supra note 25, at 
192–225; Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does it Mean for 
the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2008); 
Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV 877 (2011). 
34 Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of 
Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 312 (1980) (attesting to the importance of the Erie 
doctrine as the keystone to American civil procedure). 
35 As Lawrence Solum says, “[a]ny discussion of substance and procedure 
that does not start with Erie will nonetheless be interpreted by American judges, 
lawyers, and legal academics with Erie’s legacy in mind.  In a sense, the question 
‘What is procedure?’ begins with Erie—whether we like it or not.”  Solum, supra 
note 25, at 193. 
36 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). The decision in Swift rested on the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, which provides that 
“[t]he laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or 
statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as 
rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in 
cases where they apply.”  In Swift, the court adopted a restrictive interpretation of 
the “laws of the several states” that included statutory law and “local” common 
law, but excluded “general” state common law.  In Erie, the Supreme Court 
interpreted “laws of the several States” to include general state common law, 
citing “the work of a competent scholar” as to the original intent behind in the 
Rules of Decision Act.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 n.5 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on 
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L .REV. 49 (1923)). 
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substantive rules of common law.37  By the same token, no one 
doubted federal authority to develop rules of procedure for the 
federal courts to apply in diversity actions.38  Indeed, four years 
before the Court’s Erie decision, Congress had passed the Rules 
Enabling Act, asserting federal power to promulgate for the federal 
courts “rules of practice and procedure.”39  In a nutshell, the 
conventional understanding of Erie is that “federal courts sitting in 
diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural 
law.”40 
In Erie itself, Justice Reed foresaw future problems, pointing 
out that “[t]he line between procedural and substantive law is 
hazy.”41  Sure enough, a series of Supreme Court decisions has 
followed, and the Court has sometimes struggled to apply the 
distinction consistently.42  Is a state statute of limitations 
                                                     
37 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (stating that the Constitution does not confer on federal 
courts the power to make substantive federal law). 
38 In Erie, Justice Reed stated in concurrence that “no one doubts federal 
power over procedure.”  Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring). 
39 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).  The grant of rule-making authority further helped to 
enshrine the procedure-substance distinction by providing that the Federal Rules 
could “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”  Id. § 2072(b).  For 
the history behind the Rules Enabling Act, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). 
40 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (explaining 
Erie’s reading of the Rules of Decision Act).  For a challenge to this conventional 
understanding, see Steinman, supra note 33 (arguing that the Erie doctrine 
requires federal courts to follow state law on many procedural issues, including 
summary judgment and class certification, because the application of federal 
procedural rules would interfere unduly with substantive state-law rights). 
41 Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring) (surmising that it may be difficult 
to differentiate between substantive and procedural law as the majority opinion 
posits). 
42 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 
(2010) (holding that a New York law prohibiting class actions for a certain cause 
of action did not preclude a federal court sitting in diversity from hearing a class 
action under Federal Rule 23); Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 
497 (2001) (holding that the claim-preclusive effect of a decision by a federal 
district court sitting in diversity is governed by the laws of the state where the 
deciding court is located); Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415 (allowing New York’s more 
invasive standard for judicial review of jury awards to apply in a federal court 
sitting in diversity); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (ruling that federal 
courts should apply the federal rule regarding service of process); Byrd v. Blue 
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (holding that federal courts  sitting in 
diversity should follow federal practice of having the issue of eligibility for 
workers’ compensation determined by a jury, despite state law rule favoring 
judicial determination); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (allowing 
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procedural or substantive?  (Answer: perhaps surprisingly, 
substantive.)43  Is a rule providing a valid method of service of 
process procedural or substantive?  (Answer: procedural.)44  In the 
most recent Erie doctrine case, Shady Grove, Justice Scalia used 
quotations from previous cases to reiterate the Court’s 
longstanding definition of procedure.45  Procedure, he wrote, is 
“the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by 
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress 
for disregard or infraction of them.”46  “If [a procedural rule] 
governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the litigants’ 
rights are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it alters ‘the rules of decision by 
which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,’ it is not.”47 
As well as court procedure, lawyers and scholars must attend 
to law-making procedure.  How is (and should) law-making power 
(be) allocated among different branches of government, and 
between the federal government and state government?  Some 
procedural questions straddle the law-making/adjudication 
boundary.  Procedural questions include general questions of legal 
method: questions about the methodology for interpreting statutes, 
questions about whether and when to follow or disregard 
precedent, and questions about how much power courts should 
have to review the decisions of administrative agencies.  These, 
too, are procedural questions for the purposes of my description of 
proceduralism. 
                                                                                                                        
federal court to apply federal rules if the outcome would be substantially the 
same as applying state rules). 
43 See Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 110, 112 (holding that state statute of 
limitations applies since applying the corresponding federal rule would 
substantially alter the outcome of the case). 
44 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463–64, 473–74 (enforcing the federal rule regarding 
service of process as a procedural rule). 
45 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 
(1941); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464; Burlington Northern R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 
(1987); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946)). 
46 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
47 Id. (quoting Murphree, 326 U.S. at 446).  Cf. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109 
(“[Procedure is] the manner and the means by which a [substantive-law] right to 
recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced.”). 
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2.2. Proceduralism as Belief in the Centrality of Procedural Questions 
Now that we know what procedure is, what is 
proceduralism?48  As I define it, proceduralism is simply the 
tendency to believe that procedure is centrally important.49  
Arguments premised on the importance of procedure are 
proceduralist (or proceduralistic); people who generally tend to 
believe procedure is important are proceduralists.  We can also 
diagnose proceduralism on a larger scale: participants in and 
observers of a proceduralist legal culture allocate relatively larger 
proportions of their interests, energies, and attentions to questions 
of procedure rather than to questions of substantive law. 
My definition is purposefully broad, and, though usage has 
been far from consistent, my version at least has the advantage of 
covering most things that have been called “proceduralism” or 
“proceduralist” in the legal literature.50  First, it includes someone 
who thinks that only procedure matters.  In the context of legal 
debates, it is hard to find anyone who really believes that only 
procedure matters.  Legal writers do sometimes use this narrow 
definition of proceduralism either as an ideal-type51 or to caricature 
                                                     
48 On the varieties of meanings of words ending in “-ist” and “-ism”, see, for 
example, Adrienne Lehrer, A Note on the Semantics of -Ist and -Ism, 63 AM. SPEECH 
181 (1988) (noting the emergence of “racism,”“ageism,” and “speciesism”); 
Michael R. Dressman, The Suffix -Ist, 60 AM. SPEECH 238 (1985) (discussing the 
divergence of and differences between -ist, -ism, and -ize); cf. MORRISSEY, You 
Know I Couldn’t Last, on YOU ARE THE QUARRY (ATTACK Records 2004) (“[E]very   
-ist and every -ism thrown my way to stay.”). 
49 See Damien Geradin, The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What 
the EU Should Learn From American Experience, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 47 (2004) 
(cautioning against “‘proceduralism,’ whereby a disproportionate amount of time 
and energy is devoted to procedural issues”).  Geradin’s definition of 
proceduralism is similar to mine except that he adds a pejorative connotation. 
50 My definition, however, does not seem to fit Edward Janger’s theory of 
“Universal Proceduralism” for resolving choice-of-law questions in cross-border 
insolvency law.  See Edward J. Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
819 (2007) (proposing universal but minimally harmonized rules of transnational 
bankruptcy procedure, and non-uniform substantive law).  Cf. Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, A Comment on Universal Proceduralism, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 503 
(2010) (criticizing Janger’s theory of universal proceduralism).  
51 See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
312, 321 (1997) (defining “proceduralism” as the kind of justificatory theory of 
democracy that is “indifferent to the substantive decisions produced by a 
particular governmental arrangement, caring only that, according to some 
particular substantive moral theory, the procedures used to produce those 
decisions either are inherently good or promote good effects”). 
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the arguments of opponents.52  The definition also includes a more 
commonly held view about procedure: “the notion that good 
procedures are presumptive evidence of good results.”53  Third, 
my definition includes those who believe that more formal 
procedures (for example, a formal notice-and-comment procedure 
before administrative rule-making) will lead to better outcomes.54  
Finally, it also includes the family of views that stresses the 
intrinsic value of procedures as opposed to, or in addition to, their 
instrumental effects.55  Note, however, that within my definition, 
one need not subscribe to any particular theory to be a 
proceduralist.  Procedure may matter to a proceduralist because of 
its instrumental effects, or because procedure is valuable in its own 
right. 
Moreover, to be a proceduralist, one need not adhere to any 
particular beliefs about what counts as a good or a fair procedure.  
My argument that American legal culture is particularly 
proceduralist, therefore, is distinct from Robert Kagan’s critique of 
American overreliance on “adversarial legalism”—the excessive 
use of costly and adversarial legal processes—to implement social 
                                                     
52 See David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: 
Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 19 n.2 and accompanying text 
(describing as “myopic” the proceduralist approach “that ignores deterrence and 
compensation objectives and related individual welfare effects of the substantive 
law in evaluating the operation and potential redesign of the civil liability 
system”). 
53 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945, 964 (1989) 
(reviewing ROBERT M. COVER, OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE (1988)). 
See also Cass R. Sunstein, In Memoriam, Bernard D. Meltzer (1914–2007), 74 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 443, 444 (2007) (noting “Bernie was a craftsman because he was a 
proceduralist—one who believed, with Justice Frankfurter, that ‘the history of 
liberty has largely been the history of the observance of procedural safeguards’”). 
54 This appears to be the meaning of “proceduralism” criticized in Barron & 
Kagan, supra note 21, at 229–32. 
55 See Solum, supra note 25, at 183 (“While procedural justice is concerned 
with the benefits of accuracy and the costs of adjudication, it is not solely 
concerned with those costs and benefits.  Rather, procedural justice is deeply 
entwined with the old and powerful idea that a process that guarantees rights of 
meaningful participation is an essential prerequisite for the legitimate authority of 
action-guiding legal norms.”); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process 
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in 
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49–52 (1976) (exploring individual 
dignity as a value when evaluating procedures). 
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policies.56  According to my definition, Kagan himself is a 
proceduralist because he stresses the importance of examining and 
reforming the particular procedural solutions that Americans have 
chosen.  Regardless of the sources of their proceduralism, or their 
own views about what counts as good procedure, proceduralists 
stand out for their belief that procedure is at least as important as 
matters of “substance.”57  Where proceduralist ideas prevail, 
procedural questions have a higher degree of salience.58 
3. AMERICAN PROCEDURALISM IN CIVIL JUSTICE 
My focus in this Article is on proceduralism in civil justice.59  It 
is not that proceduralism is especially pronounced in civil justice; 
in fact, proceduralism is perhaps a more widely accepted feature in 
                                                     
56 As I explain in Section 4.1, infra, however, there is surely a link between the 
American focus on procedural questions and the particular procedural solutions 
American legal institutions have chosen. 
57 In this way, my analysis of proceduralism is structurally similar to a 
comparative-law analytic distinction drawn by James Whitman between 
“consumerism” and “producerism.”  See James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus 
Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340 (2007).  Whitman’s 
purpose is to undertake a comparative-law analysis of the supposed 
encroachment of American consumerism in continental Europe; along the way, he 
contrasts consumerism with its opposite, producerism.  The point, according to 
Whitman, is not that American law simply favors consumers, or that European 
law simply favors producers.  Rather, the point is that Americans tend to consider 
the debate between competing perceptions of consumer interest to be important, 
while Europeans tend to lend greater importance to questions about producers’ 
interests.  On Whitman’s exposition, what is distinctive about a consumerist legal 
order is that participants see the rights and interests on the demand side of the 
market as significant.  A producerist legal order focuses on the supply side, with 
the rights and interests of different classes of producer—workers vs. employers, 
small businesses vs. large businesses, and so forth—dominating debates. 
58 On the concept of salience, see Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s 
Agenda—And the Nation’s, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 
n.40 (2006) (describing salience as “weighty prominence” and distinguishing it 
from “mere importance, mere knowledge, or even mere prominence”). 
59 For an attempt to approach civil and criminal procedure from a single 
perspective, see Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural 
Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 85–86 (2008) (“There are (almost) no general 
proceduralists, only criminal proceduralists and civil proceduralists who, like the 
blind men in John Godfrey Saxe’s The Blind Men and the Elephant, ‘see’ only part of 
the picture.”).  I will mostly leave the specific field of administrative law to one 
side.  But there, perhaps more than anywhere else, proceduralism reigns.  See 
Mashaw, supra note 21; Barron & Kagan, supra note 21; HORWITZ, supra note 21. 
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the criminal field.60  My first aim, then, is to establish the 
significance of procedure in the intellectual life of American civil 
justice.  I reinforce the point by contrasting the peripheral position 
that procedure plays in the academic legal education and 
scholarship in England. 
                                                     
60 As Bill Stuntz has shown, the Warren Court attempted to rein in the 
excesses of police and prosecutors mainly by conferring new procedural rights on 
defendants, rather than by regulating the substantive law of crimes.  See generally 
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, supra note 14.  See also STUNTZ, 
THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 216–242  Stuntz 
argued that this focus on criminal procedure backfired, partly because the 
Supreme Court essentially left legislatures a free hand as they expanded the scope 
of substantive criminal law.  On Stuntz’s account, “[t]he Supreme Court decided 
to regulate policing and procedure, and the politicians responded with a forty-
year backlash of overcriminalization and overpunishment.”  Stuntz, The Political 
Constitution of Criminal Justice, supra note 14, at 849–50.  Whether or not Stuntz is 
right to consider this procedural strategy an error, it is plain that the Warren 
Court largely disregarded substantive criminal law and looked for procedural 
solutions.  Justice Stevens finds Stuntz’s critique of “Earl Warren’s errors” 
“surprisingly unpersuasive,” but accepts the premise of “our system’s focus upon 
criminal procedure rather than substance.”  John Paul Stevens, Our ‘Broken 
System’ of Criminal Justice, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, November 10, 2011 (reviewing 
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14). 
In response to Warren Court reforms, law-and-order forces in the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts and in the Congress fought procedure with procedure, 
making it more difficult to assert procedural rights by erecting more and more 
procedural barriers to post-conviction relief in the federal courts.  See 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub L. No 104-
32, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) 
[parenthetical according to rule 12.2.2, p. 113].  The result of the AEDPA and 
judicially created procedural obstacles to federal-court review of state-court 
convictions is that “[f]ederal judges expend enormous amounts of time reviewing 
habeas petitions from state prisoners, but much of that time is spent finding ways 
to dismiss the petitions on procedural grounds without ever addressing their 
merits.”  Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 1–2 (2010); see also Larry Yackle, State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening 
the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 541, 542 (2006) (“The failure of 
federal habeas to help correct problems in state criminal justice systems is 
particularly regrettable given evidence that states systematically violate criminal 
defendants’ rights.”).  Cf. Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 303, 320–69 (1993) (noting the Supreme Court’s evasion of jurisdictional 
barriers to habeas review in pursuit of equitable results).  Both conservative and 
pro-defendant voices decry excessive proceduralism in American criminal justice.  
See Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional 
Claims Raised By State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 315–17 (noting that the law-and-order 
“overproceduralism” critique laments the overprotection of criminal defendants 
and the devolution of criminal trials into procedural morass, while defense 
lawyers and civil rights activists lament the numerous procedural bars to post-
conviction relief). 
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3.1. The Centrality of Procedure in American Civil Justice 
The obvious place to start is civil procedure.  Civil procedure is 
at the heart of American legal curriculum.  By “civil procedure,” of 
course, I mean the rules and principles governing how a legal 
system enforces the rights and duties created by substantive law: 
in which court an action may be brought, the standards for 
pleading and summary judgment, the scope of pre-trial discovery, 
the allocation of responsibility for lawyers’ fees, and so on.  In the 
first-year curriculum, these procedural questions stand on a similar 
footing to questions of substantive law.  This insight may seem 
either surprising or obvious to American readers, but I hope to 
establish that it is both true and significant. 
American law schools aspire to be professional schools, so it is 
unsurprising that the rules governing litigation appear somewhere 
on the curriculum.  However, students don’t just learn civil 
procedure as preparation for the bar exam.  Rather, it is an integral 
component of the standard first-year curriculum.  Every American 
law student takes civil procedure, and the professors who teach the 
subject engage in vigorous scholarly debates and discuss a steady 
stream of major Supreme Court decisions.61  The cultural 
prominence of civil procedure is impressed on the American law 
student from day one.62  Law students are taught to approach 
procedural questions not simply as technical rules they need to 
learn if they are to argue about substantive questions.  Rather, 
procedural questions are themselves the site of intellectually 
challenging arguments about justice, rights, efficiency, and 
sovereignty.  This is true even in more doctrinally focused civil 
procedure courses that focus on the Federal Rules. 
Often, American civil procedure courses begin with the topic of 
personal jurisdiction.  What might otherwise seem a technical issue 
becomes, in the hands of any reasonably competent American law 
professor, a vehicle for exploring questions of state sovereignty, 
                                                     
61 Cf. Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure 
Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 314–15 (2012) (welcoming the Supreme Court’s recent 
re-engagement with civil procedure, and noting that the Court has decided more 
than twenty civil procedure cases in the last six terms). 
62 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Structuring Complexity, Disciplining Reality: The 
Challenge of Teaching Civil Procedure in a Time of Change, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1191, 
1191 (1993) (“[S]tudents find procedure enormously complex and challenging, 
and it has the reputation for being the hardest course in the first-year 
curriculum.”). 
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individual fairness, and legal method.  Students become familiar 
with the formalistic territorial approach exemplified by Pennoyer v. 
Neff,63 the “minimum contacts” revolution of International Shoe 
Company v. Washington,64 and the more recent reassertion of formal 
reasoning in cases like Burnham v. Superior Court of California.65  The 
Supreme Court produced two major fresh personal jurisdiction 
decisions in 2011.66  Immediately, the American student sees civil 
procedure as vital—worthy of strident debate by Supreme Court 
Justices67—rather than as a dry set of rules subservient to 
substantive law. 
Another important topic for the first-year law student is 
pleading: what must the plaintiff include in the complaint to 
survive a pre-answer motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim?  
Again, this might sound at first like a minor question, but in 
America it raises basic questions about citizens’ rights of access to 
the courts.  Formally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require 
only “notice pleading,” but two recent Supreme Court decisions 
hold that, in fairness to defendants, plaintiffs ought to put more 
flesh on the bones of their complaints.68  A federal-court plaintiff is 
now required to state a claim for relief that is facially plausible,69 a 
                                                     
63 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
64 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
65 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
66 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
67 The Supreme Court has issued several fractured and sharply divided 
rulings in cases concerning personal jurisdiction over a non-forum defendant 
whose goods cause harm after being taken to the forum jurisdiction.  See McIntyre, 
131 S. Ct. at 2786–91 (plurality opinion) (concluding that a court cannot exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who did not purposely avail herself of the 
privilege of doing business in the forum State); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior 
Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion) (concluding that a mere awareness 
that a product may reach a jurisdiction when placed in the stream of commerce is 
not enough to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (holding that a non-resident 
must purposely avail himself of the state’s privileges and protections for that state 
to have personal jurisdiction over him). 
68 For an argument that these cases bring United States pleading standards 
closer to those in England and elsewhere, see Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba, 
Global Civil Procedure Trends in the Twenty-First Century, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 1, 3–8 (2011). 
69 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (establishing a “facial 
plausibility” standard for pleadings); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 
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development that has inspired a predictably vast amount of 
scholarly commentary.70 
For the moment, allow me one more example from the Civil 
Procedure curriculum, already mentioned above:71 choice of law in 
the federal courts—the Erie doctrine, a “key part of the rite of 
passage” for American law students.72  Three things about the Erie 
doctrine are particularly relevant here.  First, students (their 
professor hopes) understand that, beneath the Supreme Court’s 
lawyerly discussions of precedent and doctrine, lurk larger 
questions of sovereignty and law-making power.  Second, 
American law students are presented with powerful evidence of 
how important procedural rules are.  A significant post-Erie lesson 
is that plaintiffs, with their penchant for forum-shopping, 
obviously think that the identity of the court that hears a lawsuit 
may make a big difference to the case’s outcome.  Third, the Erie 
doctrine teaches students that the line between procedural rules 
and substantive rules is highly problematic and difficult to draw.  
Debates over procedural rules, just as much as substantive rules, 
raise crucial questions of justice and efficiency. 
                                                                                                                        
(2007) (ruling that a complaint requires “enough factual matter (taken as true)” to 
suggest that the claim is meritorious). 
70 Any attempt at an exhaustive list of law review articles on Iqbal and 
Twombly would be doomed to failure, but here are some examples: Martin H. 
Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and 
Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773 (2011); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Processing Pleadings and the Psychology of Prejudgment, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 413 
(2011); Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment 
Discrimination, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215; Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil 
Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597 (2010); Arthur R. 
Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, 
Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010); Adam N. 
Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010); Edward A. Hartnett, 
Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010); Robert G. Bone, 
Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the 
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading 
and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109 (2009); Richard 
A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) 
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2007). 
71 See Section 2.1, supra.  
72 Rowe, supra note 33, at 1015 (“[T]his area combines inherent complexity 
and interest while being a key part of the rite of passage through which most of us 
went and continue to put our students.”). 
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The focus on procedure does not end with the first year of law 
school.  Students often have a variety of procedural options to 
choose from in their second and third years.  Indeed, the elective 
course often considered the most rigorous and demanding in 
American law schools—named “Federal Courts,” “Federal Courts 
and the Federal System,” “Federal Jurisdiction,” or some variation 
thereon—includes a healthy dose of civil procedure, integrated 
with grand constitutional themes of federalism and separation of 
powers.73  “Fed Courts” is a kind of finishing school for the elite 
law student interested in litigation.  The class is most often 
anchored by a famous casebook penned in the 1950s by Hart and 
Wechsler,74 though there are alternative texts.75  The subject-matter 
of Federal Courts includes the following topics: the extent of 
federal-court jurisdiction; the States’ sovereign immunity from 
suits and Congress’ power to abrogate that immunity; Supreme 
Court review of state-court decisions; choice of law in the federal 
courts (including another helping of Erie doctrine); remedies for 
violations of constitutional rights; justiciability (ripeness, mootness, 
and the “political question” doctrine); and the power of federal 
district courts to abstain from exercising their jurisdiction.  The 
course requires an understanding of the relations between, on the 
one hand, states and their court systems and, on the other, the 
federal government and its courts system.  These relations are 
inseparable from ideological and political conflicts in American 
history, from the founding of the Republic, through the era of 
Jacksonian Democracy, the Civil War, the Reconstruction Period, 
the New Deal, the Civil Rights Era, and so on. 
To take but one example, a key topic in Federal Courts is 
habeas corpus review of state court judgments of criminal 
convictions.  The topic straddles civil and criminal procedure.76  
                                                     
73 See Steve Vladeck, Things You Oughta Know if You Teach Federal Courts, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 21, 2012, 6:48 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfs 
blawg/2012/03/things-you-oughta-know-if-you-teach-federal-courts.html 
(stating that there are three “classical views” of the Federal Courts course: 1. “as 
an advanced civil procedure course”; 2. “as an advanced constitutional law 
course”; 3. “as a federal remedies course”) (emphasis omitted). 
74 The book is now in its sixth edition: RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART 
AND WECHSLER’S FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th ed. 2009). 
75 See, e.g., PETER W. LOW, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS (7th ed. 2011). 
76 A petition for habeas corpus is a civil action against the jailer.  See Donald 
A. Dripps, On Reach and Grasp in Criminal Procedure: Crawford in California, 37 
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The boundaries of this form of relief have waxed and waned along 
with broader shifts in the politics of American federalism and law-
and-order politics.  In the 1960s, while simultaneously expanding 
the procedural rights of criminal defendants, the Supreme Court 
opened the doors of the federal district courts to those claiming 
that their state court convictions were procured by violations of 
those rights.  Since then, after a series of decisions by the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts cutting back on this form of relief, a 
Republican Congress further restricted the availability of a federal 
forum for state prisoners in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, mandating a host of jurisdictional obstacles for 
prisoners and highly deferential standards of review. 
Again, reviewing this body of doctrine and its history 
impresses upon the student the importance of procedure.77  
Students also come into contact with the gargantuan academic 
literature that attends Federal Courts questions.78  Only a minority 
of students take a Federal Courts class, but those who do go on to 
exert a disproportionate influence on the legal system.  To a large 
extent, these are the students who win fancy clerkships with 
federal judges, work as litigators at the most lucrative firms, and, 
more importantly, attain influential jobs in government, become 
law professors, and later become judges in the higher courts.79 
As a further illustration of the richness of American procedural 
scholarship, consider the school of thought originating at Yale Law 
School in the 1970s and identified as “metaprocedure” by William 
Eskridge.80  In a review article of a set of teaching materials by 
                                                                                                                        
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 349, 355 (2011) (discussing some of the complexities 
that arise when federal courts intervene in state criminal procedure). 
77 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why and How to Teach Federal Courts Today, 53 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 693, 693 (2009) (noting the prevalent idea that “a sophisticated 
Federal Courts course should yield insights more profound than those that 
emerge from any other public law offering,” but calling it a “myth”). 
78 See Thomas E. Baker, Federal Court Practice and Procedure: A Third Branch 
Bibliography, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 909 (1999 (a two hundred-page long 
“comprehensive bibliography of books and articles dealing with the various 
aspects of the federal courts and federal court procedures”). 
79 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Teaching Federal Courts: Federal Judges as Problem 
Solvers, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 729, 734 (2009) (“[Federal Courts] is a course that is 
almost always appealing to the students who are on law review or are planning to 
do clerkships.”). 
80 See generally, Eskridge, supra note 53; see also ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. 
FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE, at vi (1979) (explaining that the assembled 
essays in the book “might be seen as giving preliminary shape to a field of inquiry 
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Robert Cover, Owen Fiss, and Judith Resnik, Eskridge felt able to 
describe the casebook as “an intellectual Mardi Gras—a joyous, 
outrageous, intense feast of ideas that seeks to revolutionize the 
subject.”81  By “[e]mphasizing the intellectual and socio-political 
structures of procedure rather than its nuts and bolts, Cover, Fiss 
and Resnik propound[ed] a radically new way of teaching 
procedure to students.”82  The point was to get students to think 
fundamentally about the value of procedure, and, for the authors 
of the casebook, litigation was “a public event rather than simply a 
means of resolving private disputes.”83  Partly because Yale Law 
School has produced so many law professors from the ranks of its 
former students, the metaprocedure approach spread far beyond 
its New Haven home.  By the late 1980s, “a significant number of 
teachers . . . call[ed] themselves ‘proceduralists.’”84 
Nevertheless, many contemporary American proceduralists 
apparently consider their field an “academic backwater,”85 when 
compared to other legal fields.  At the very least, I want to console 
American proceduralists with the thought that things could be 
much, much worse.  As I will suggest in the next section, the view 
from outside the United States looks very different indeed. 
3.2. A Comparative Example: Civil Procedure at the Periphery in 
England 
The vibrancy and intensity of American debates about civil 
procedure is best understood in comparative relief.  Here, I 
                                                                                                                        
very much in flux”).  For a more skeptical review, see Mark V. Tushnet, 
Metaprocedure?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 161 (1989) (criticizing the primary arguments 
made in Cover, Fiss, and Resnik’s casebook, PROCEDURE, supra note 53).  See also 
Linda S. Mullenix, God, Metaprocedure, and Metarealism at Yale, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
1139, 1142 (1989) (reflecting on the influence that PROCEDURE, supra note 53, has 
had on the procedural debate). 
81 Eskridge, supra note 53, at 947. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Mullenix, supra note 80, at 1142. 
85 See id. at 1141 (referring to civil procedure as “a legal specialization 
normally lacking in intellectual excitement”); Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and 
Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 516 (2006) (“[M]y claim that procedure has 
become an academic backwater is singing to the choir; those interested enough to 
read this Article know what I mean.”) 
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contrast the very different position in England.86  England is a close 
legal cousin to the United States in many ways, making 
comparison a fruitful exercise, because it reduces the number of 
variables.87  Moreover, focusing on the English contrast is 
particularly useful because it cuts off the argument that an 
American-style degree of proceduralism is an inherent feature of 
the common-law tradition.88  Given the practical importance of 
procedural questions to the lives of lawyers and to the outcome of 
cases, the minor role that civil procedure plays in contemporary 
English legal education and scholarship is extraordinary. 
English legal academics have almost entirely ceded the 
territory of civil procedure to the legal profession.89  The most 
obvious symptom of civil procedure’s neglect is its marginal place 
in legal education.  The standard path to a legal career as a solicitor 
                                                     
86 “England” here is shorthand for “England and Wales.”  What I say about 
England and Wales appears to be true throughout the United Kingdom, but 
Scotland’s legal system and culture remain distinct from England’s; Northern 
Ireland, too, may present special features that would unduly complicate the 
analysis. 
87 P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 
1987 DUKE L.J. 1002, 1004-05 (“England is still thought to share much of American 
legal culture and legal ideals, even if, to paraphrase George Bernard Shaw, 
England and America sometimes appear to be two countries divided by a 
common legal heritage.”) (footnote omitted). 
88 I have not sought to gauge the level of proceduralism in civil-law systems.  
But there are some suggestions in the literature that, in the twentieth century, at 
least, procedure had an even lower scholarly and curricular profile in continental 
Europe than in England.  See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity 
Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1211 (2005) (“In sharp contrast to American law schools, 
which treat the study of procedure as a fundamental component of legal 
education, continental European law faculties deem procedure to be of negligible 
interest and focus instead on conveying abstract principles of substantive law.”); 
Mirjan Damaška, A Continental Lawyer in an American Law School: Trials and 
Tribulations of Adjustment, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (1968) (stating that an 
American lawyer would be surprised that he would “almost never . . . find 
discussion of the influence of procedural considerations on substantive issues’ in a 
Continental law faculty”). 
89 Hence, Atiyah and Summers wrote in 1987 that “English academics have 
abandoned certain subjects entirely to the professions.  Thus there is very little (if 
any) law school teaching of such subjects as legal ethics and civil procedure.”  P.S. 
ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
407 (1987).  See also P.S. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM AND THEORY IN ENGLISH LAW 133 
(1987) (“What the academics need to bear in mind is that it is not their task to ape 
the practitioners.”). 
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or barrister in England is a three-stage process: (1) a three-year 
undergraduate degree in law at a university (the “academic 
stage”); (2) a year of classroom instruction in the more mundane 
knowledge needed to practice law (the “vocational stage”); and (3) 
a one-year or two-year period of apprenticeship.90  At the academic 
stage, English legal scholars and the students they teach divide law 
into the substantive law categories at the core of a law degree: 
contract law, tort law, land law, trusts law, constitutional law, 
administrative law, and European law.91  The vast majority of 
English law students pass through their degrees without ever 
thinking seriously about civil procedure.  Indeed, it was impossible 
in the academic year 2011-12 for an undergraduate law student to 
take a civil procedure course at four of the law schools ranked in 
the top five by The Times.92  For the most part, anything a student 
might learn about civil procedure in the academic stage of legal 
education comes accidentally when learning substantive law.93  
John Langbein, who studied law in England and in the United 
States, has said: “If I were given the power to make one change in 
                                                     
90 Lawyers in England and Wales are either solicitors or barristers.  Budding 
solicitors spend two years as “trainees” before qualifying.  Young barristers spend 
one year as “pupils” before being called to the Bar.  See Nigel Duncan, Gatekeepers 
Training Hurdlers: The Training and Accreditation of Lawyers in England and Wales, 20 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 911, 913 (2004). 
91 As a condition of recognizing a law degree, the legal professions require 
universities to offer the following compulsory subjects: “(1) Public Law, including 
Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and Human Rights; (2) Law of the 
European Union; (3) Criminal Law; (4) Obligations, including Contract, 
Restitution, and Tort; (5) Property Law; and, (6) Equity and the Law of Trusts.”  
Duncan, supra note 90, at 913 n.6. 
92 The top five English law schools in The Times’s “Good University Guide 
2011” were as follows: Oxford; Cambridge; the London School of Economics; 
University College, London; and Durham.  Even at Cambridge, the only one of 
the five to offer civil procedure to undergraduates, it could only be taken as a 
“half-subject” in the student’s final year.  Some of the other schools do offer civil 
procedure as an option for post-graduate students taking master’s degrees in law. 
93 Some students will learn something about civil procedure when they take 
administrative law; many English texts and courses cover the special procedures 
governing judicial review of government action. See, e.g., WILLIAM WADE & 
CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. 18 (10th ed. 2010).  And some 
students may learn about pre-judgment remedies in courses on Equity.  See, e.g., 
JILL E. MARTIN, HANBURY & MARTIN: MODERN EQUITY chs. 23 & 24 (18th ed. 2009).  
But the point remains: the vast majority of students never study civil procedure as 
a subject in its own right during a law degree.  
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English legal education, it would be to have civil procedure taken 
seriously.”94 
It is not that English civil procedure is devoid of significant 
problems to study.  Far from it: the past fifteen years have seen the 
English legal system in a fairly constant state of procedural 
turbulence.  The late 1990s brought the Woolf Reforms, named 
after the judge whose report on Access to Justice contended that the 
civil justice system was too slow, too unequal, too costly, too 
uncertain, too fragmented, too adversarial, and too complex.  The 
Access to Justice report formed the basis for wholesale changes in 
the civil litigation system and a whole new set of Civil Procedure 
Rules.95  The Woolf Reforms ushered in a new interventionist 
approach to case management and aimed to promote the use of 
alternative dispute resolution.96  The new rules expand the 
availability of summary judgment, a remedy previously 
unavailable in large classes of cases.97  Moreover, England has 
altered its litigation-funding rules to allow “no win, no fee” 
agreements in some cases, prompting radical innovations in the 
                                                     
94 John H. Langbein, Scholarly and Professional Objectives in Legal Education: 
American Trends and English Comparisons, in 2 PRESSING PROBLEMS IN THE LAW: 
WHAT ARE LAW SCHOOLS FOR? 1, 1 (P.B.H. Birks ed., 1996).  See also JACK I.H. JACOB, 
THE FABRIC OF ENGLISH CIVIL JUSTICE 252 (The Hamlyn Lectures, Thirty-Eighth 
Series, 1986) (noting the “deplorable fact” that civil procedure is generally not a 
required subject for obtaining a law degree). 
95 The Woolf Reforms also imposed a large-scale reform of terminology in the 
hopes of making legal language more accessible to the general public.  Thus 
England no longer has “plaintiffs,” but instead has “claimants.”  Writs of 
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus have been renamed “quashing order,” 
“prohibiting order,” and “mandatory order,” respectively.  A civil action was 
previously started by “writ” or by “summons”; now the originating document is a 
“claim form.”  The pleadings in an action are called the “statements of case.”  See 
Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, S.I. 1998/3132 (L. 17) (Eng. & Wales) (laying down 
the rules of civil procedure in the High Court, county courts, and Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division)). 
96 See NEIL ANDREWS, THE MODERN CIVIL PROCESS: JUDICIAL AND ALTERNATIVE 
FORMS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ENGLAND pt. III (2008) (discussing alternative 
civil justice including settlement, mediation, and the framework of English 
arbitration); LORD WOOLF M.R., HM’S STATIONERY OFFICE, LORD CHANCELLORS 
DEP’T, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT (1996) (U.K.) (aiming to “simplify and 
harmonize” procedures for High Court and county court cases). 
97 Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, S.I. 1998/3132 (L. 17) (Eng. & Wales) pt. 24 
(touching upon summary judgment, “a procedure by which the court may decide 
a claim or a particular issue without a trial”). 
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legal profession in the personal injury field,98 and a rearguard 
action by insurance companies.  Remarkably, a generally favorable 
court decision99 has created a fledgling industry devoted to third-
party funding of litigation.100  And England is experimenting with 
the “group action,” a diluted form of the American class action.101  
Taken together, these reforms amount to major changes in the 
administration of civil justice. 
But despite the abundance of procedural tumult, “[c]ivil 
procedure scholars are a rare breed.”102  One writer justly notes the 
“paucity of rigorous analytical or theoretical literature dealing with 
civil justice matters” in common-law countries other than the 
United States.103  It is common to lament that writers on English 
                                                     
98 See Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Regimes and the Cost of Civil Justice, 28 CIV. JUST. 
Q. 344 (2009) (analyzing reforms of fee systems for lawyers). 
99 Arkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 655, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3055 
(Eng.) (permitting the practice of professional third-party litigation funding and 
limiting a third-party funder’s liability for costs to the extent of the funding it 
provided). 
100 See Rachael Mulheron & Peter Cashman, Third-Party Funding of Litigation: 
A Changing Landscape, 27 CIV. JUST. Q. 312, 312–13 (2008) (“There has been an 
increasing number of litigation funders and brokers entering into the market; 
hedge fund interest in backing commercial litigation has expanded; . . . a 
consultation by the Office of Fair Trading has endorsed third-party funding in 
private actions for breaches of competition law; and Sir Anthony Clarke M.R. has 
extra-judicially expressed ‘in principle’ approval for regulated litigation 
funding.”) (citing Private Actions in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumers 
and Business 27-28 (Office of Fair Trading Discussion Paper, OFT916, Apr. 2007), 
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916.pdf; 
Neil Rose, Drive for Transparency on Third-Party Funding, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE, Feb. 
14, 2008, http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/drive-transparency-third-party-
funding (“I am in principle a supporter of third-party funding, provided that 
appropriate regulation is put in place.”)). 
101 See generally Rachael Mulheron, Recent Milestones in Class Actions Reform in 
England: A Critique and Proposal, 127 LAW Q. REV. 288 (2011) (discussing the 
preference for sectoral reform which English governmental policy-makers have 
shown to date). 
102 Susan M.C. Gibbons, Book Review, 122 LAW Q. REV. 336, 336 (2006) 
(reviewing RACHAEL P. MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL 
SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2004)); see also JACOB, supra note 94, at 252–
53 (“[T]here is hardly any research taking place in the subject at Universities . . . 
[C]ivil procedural law remains the Cinderella of the legal academic world.”).  The 
problem is longstanding.  In 1926, an English legal scholar remarked that “very 
little has been written upon Civil Procedure of a critical or analytical character 
since the days of Bentham.”  See Maurice Amos, A Day in Court at Home and 
Abroad, 2 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 340, 340 (1926). 
103 See Susan M.C. Gibbons, AAS Zuckerman Civil Procedure, 4 OXFORD U. 
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 129, 130 (2004) (book review) (noting that civil procedure has 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss3/3
03_MACMAHON-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/6/2013  7:56 PM 
2013] AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 573 
 
civil procedure focus too much on the “nuts and bolts,” and that 
scholars should “give more attention to the purposes [civil 
[procedure] serves.”104  There are some recent signs of change.105  
The implementation of the Woolf Reforms inspired two 
outstanding treatises—one emanating from Oxford,106 the other 
from Cambridge.107  But these books are bright stars in an 
otherwise dark sky, and given their cost, their level of detail, and 
the absence of civil procedure on the curriculums of most law 
schools, they are mostly read by practitioners and judges.108  One 
scholar, reviewing the two treatises in 2005, said that “[t]he 
arguments in favour of civil procedure’s forming an important part 
of English legal studies have long been overwhelming; yet the 
resources have been lacking.”109  Though hopeful for the future, the 
reviewer aptly summed up civil procedure’s current position in 
England: “many students and academics working on English law 
                                                                                                                        
not attracted a high level of academic attention or sustained critical examination 
as compared with other areas of law). 
104 J.A. JOLOWICZ, ON CIVIL PROCEDURE, at ix (2000) (claiming that English legal 
scholars “have concentrated almost exclusively and for far too long on the ‘nuts 
and bolts’ of litigation and, in particular, on its costs and its delays”). 
105 In addition to doctrinal work, there has also been some serious empirical 
work on English civil justice by socio-legal scholars.  See, e.g., HAZEL GENN, 
JUDGING CIVIL JUSTICE (2010); Hazel Genn, Understanding Civil Justice, 50 CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBS. 155 (1997). 
106 ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES OF 
PRACTICE (2006).  Cf. Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism 
into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709 (2005) (reviewing, inter alia, 
ZUCKERMAN, supra).  Zuckerman’s treatise combines an unusual degree of 
theoretical rigor with doctrinal discussions.  In a recent court decision, the book 
was described as a “valuable pioneering exposition of the principles of procedural 
law.”  Emerald Supplies Ltd. v. British Airways plc, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 1284, 
[2011] 2 W.L.R. 203, 205 (Eng.).  Unsurprisingly, given the state of English 
scholarship on civil procedure, Zuckerman often draws on American materials for 
theoretical background. 
107 NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NEW 
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2003).  Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Two Valuable Treatises on 
Civil Procedure, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 611 (2005) (reviewing, inter alia, 
ANDREWS, supra); Marcus, supra note 106 (reviewing, inter alia, ANDREWS, supra). 
108 See Hazard, supra note 107, at 612 (stating that Andrews’s book is “written 
primarily for barristers and solicitors engaged in litigation in England”); Dyson 
L.J., Book Review, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 389, 392 (2007) (reviewing ZUCKERMAN, supra 
note 106) (stating that Zuckerman’s book “should be in the library of anyone who 
is a serious civil litigation practitioner”). 
109 Ben McFarlane, Book Review, 121 LAW Q. REV. 343, 343 (2005) (reviewing 
ZUCKERMAN, supra note 106, and ANDREWS, supra note 107) (“[I]t has always been a 
struggle to find general treatments which can both inform and inspire.”). 
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have not been disabused of the mistaken but tenacious impression 
that civil procedure consists of an arbitrary set of technical rules, to 
be endured in the real world but ignored in university.”110  There 
are a few notable exceptions to this general rule, but the small 
number of dedicated English civil procedure scholars must feel 
isolated among, and underappreciated by, their colleagues.111 
4. PROCEDURALISM-PROMOTING FEATURES OF 
AMERICAN CIVIL LITIGATION 
One obvious form of explanation for the American 
exceptionalism identified in Section 3 is to say that procedure 
simply matters more to American civil justice.  Americans have 
shown greater faith in civil litigation than their counterparts 
elsewhere, and more willingness to harness the power of “private 
Attorneys-General.”112  And procedural questions justifiably loom 
larger in a system, like the American, where power over civil 
litigation is divided among several different actors—state courts 
and federal courts, judges and juries.  Based on these relatively 
distinctive features of American litigation, one might argue that 
questions of procedure rightly demand a larger share of American 
attention.  I believe these reasons do not fully account for 
American proceduralism, but they are a significant part of the 
story.  Again, I draw on the comparative example of England for 
support. 
4.1. American Faith in Private Litigation 
For several decades, American courts and legislatures were 
considerably more likely than their equivalents in other nations to 
respond to a social problem by conferring a private cause of action.  
Where other nations have relied on social pressure or regulatory 
actions by government agencies to check undesirable behaviour, 
Americans have often chosen instead to confer power on 
                                                     
110 Id. 
111 See ANDREWS, supra note 107, at 23 (civil procedure is “barely on the 
curricular map except in a handful of universities”). 
112 See Hazard, supra note 107, at 623 (“In both England and Germany, 
redress of injuries is regarded as a social responsibility to be managed through 
state regulatory systems, such as health care in the case of personal injury.  In the 
United States, on the other hand, injuries primarily have been addressed in terms 
of private initiative and allocation of responsibility among private actors through 
adjudication.”). 
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individual plaintiffs and their lawyers to bring lawsuits and hold 
defendants in check.  This observation is commonplace in 
comparative-law studies of American legal system.113  Americans 
have been willing to depart from traditional conceptions of civil 
litigation to make it easier for plaintiffs to hold defendants 
accountable.  Again, the English counter-example is instructive.  
Benjamin Kaplan—a Harvard proceduralist and previously the 
Reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure—observed in 1971 that “in England social problems 
have not framed themselves so readily as cases for the courts; the 
courts by reason of long disengagement have not been looked to as 
dynamic instruments of public betterment.”114  Social problems, we 
might add, do not really “frame themselves”; people frame them in 
certain ways.115 
One symptom of American enthusiasm for pursuing regulatory 
goals via private litigation is the ability of juries applying state tort 
law to award large amounts of punitive damages in personal 
injury cases—notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s attempts to 
cabin their ability to do so.116  Multiple damages are also available 
in many areas of American law by legislative choice.  
Congressional authorization of treble damages in federal antitrust 
cases even led to diplomatic friction between the United Kingdom 
and the United States during the the 1970s and 1980s.117  Another 
                                                     
113 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability 
Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 291–92 (2010) (noting that many Europeans 
remain skeptical of the forms of “entrepreneurial litigation” developed in the 
United States); Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative 
Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 288–301 (2002) (outlining exceptional features of 
American procedure: the civil jury, the party-driven discovery process, the 
passive judge, and the role of warring experts). 
114 Kaplan, supra note 6, at 845 (arguing that “much more is involved [in 
questions of procedural reform] than judgments about narrow procedural 
devices”). 
115 See ERVING GOFFMANN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION 
OF EXPERIENCE (1974); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions 
and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981) (“The psychological principles 
that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of 
probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the 
same problem is framed in different ways.”). 
116 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding that an 
award of $2,000,000 in punitive damages was grossly excessive). 
117 See, e.g., W.C. Beckett, United Kingdom, in Symposium, Transnational 
Litigation—Part II: Perspectives from the U.S. and Abroad, 18 INT’L LAW. 773 (1984) 
(discussing the significance of United Kingdom’s Protection of Trading Interests 
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obvious result of greater American enthusiasm for “plaintiff 
power” is the class action.  Even as Congress and state legislatures 
have sought to curtail the class action, the political machinations 
and interest-group politics behind class action reform provide yet 
more grist for the American proceduralists’ mills. 
Even after many years of conservative backlash,118 various 
features of the American civil justice system remain more favorable 
to plaintiffs than those of equivalent economically advanced 
nations.  Parallel developments in the English law of supra-
compensatory damages, for example, have been considerably more 
cautious, with the courts hewing closely to the notion that the 
purpose of tort law is to award compensation.119  The longstanding 
ability of American plaintiffs’ lawyers to aggregate and control 
many small claims constitutes—to English eyes—a remarkable 
departure from the traditional bipolar conception of litigation, 
giving rise to new kinds of lawsuit and a whole host of legal and 
ethical issues.  Even after curtailments of the American class action, 
the English equivalent—the “group action”—remains in the early 
stages of its development and is exceedingly tame by 
comparison.120 
                                                                                                                        
Act 1980 as a legislative response to what it saw as excessive claims to 
jurisdiction). 
118 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding 
Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285 (2002) (discussing decades of criticism of trends 
in tort law and calls for “tort reform”). 
119 See Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.) (Eng.) (holding that 
exemplary damages were only available in three situations: “(i) oppressive, 
arbitrary or unconstitutional actions by government servants; (ii) where the 
defendant’s conduct had been calculated by him to make a profit for himself 
which might well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; (iii) where 
expressly authorized by statute . . . .”).  In recent years, however, English courts 
have loosened this restrictive approach in modest ways.  See, e.g., Kuddus v. Chief 
Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, [2001] UKHL 29, [2002] 2 A.C. 122 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (“[T]here is no basis in Rookes v Barnard [1964] 
AC 1129 for the view that the power to award exemplary damages exists only in 
torts which had been decided to have that character prior to 1964.”). 
120 One major difference is that English courts have so far taken a strict view 
of the “representativeness” requirement for an American-style “opt-out” class 
action.  A representative party must have the “same interest” as those she 
represents.  In a striking recent example, the English Court of Appeal refused to 
allow a collective litigation of an antitrust claim by direct and indirect purchasers 
of freight services.  Emerald Supplies Ltd. v. British Airways plc, [2010] EWCA 
(Civ) 1284, [2011] 2 W.L.R. 203, 218 (Eng.).  By way of contrast, a similar putative 
class action is proceeding in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York, and has already yielded several multi-million-dollar 
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Relatedly, the phenomemon of “public law litigation”121—
which allows judges to assume ongoing supervisory powers over 
schools, hospitals, prisons, police departments—“has no 
counterpart in England.”122  For reasons political and practical, 
public law litigation has fallen out of favor to some extent since its 
1970s heyday, but the recent Supreme Court decision requiring 
California to reduce its prison population is a compelling reminder 
of the potential power of American civil litigation to force 
wholesale institutional changes.123 
No comparative sketch of the English and American civil 
justice systems would be complete without considering the 
allocation of responsibility for attorney’s fees.  Under the “English 
rule,” the loser pays the winner’s costs and lawyers’ fees, while 
under the “American rule,” each side bears its own costs and 
fees.124  To the extent that America departs from the American rule, 
it does so mainly to provide one-way fee-shifting in favor of 
victorious plaintiffs in civil rights and consumer law cases as a 
means of encouraging these classes of plaintiff to bring suit.  
Meanwhile, before deciding to file an action, the English claimant 
must consider the risk that she will both lose her case and be 
obligated to pay the defendant’s legal bills.  Predictably, fewer 
English claimants are willing to stick their heads above the parapet 
to test the law’s outer limits.  In turn, American lawyers must 
expend more of their energies on devices that allow courts, before 
trial, to dispose with the greater volume of meritless cases that 
results from the more plaintiff-friendly rules. 
In sum, the American litigation system is a rough-and-tumble 
world, ripe with political controversy.  By comparison, the more 
                                                                                                                        
settlements.  See In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06–MD–1775 
(JG)(VVP), 2011 WL 2909162 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2011) (involving antitrust claims 
brought by indirect and direct purchasers against airlines engaging in price fixing 
in the air cargo industry). 
121 See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (discussing public law litigation and how it might 
redefine the place of law and courts in American politics). 
122 ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 89, at 152. 
123 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1929 (2011) (“[W]hen necessary to 
ensure compliance with a constitutional mandate, courts may enter orders placing 
limits on a prison’s population.”). 
124 E.g., David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, 
Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and “English Rule,” 15 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 583 (2005). 
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stable English procedural regime seems to lack the capacity to 
provoke such impassioned debate. 
4.2. Fragmentation of Power in American Civil Justice 
American enthusiasm for private litigation, however, is not 
enough to explain America’s exceptional proceduralism.  True, the 
greater availability and potency of American lawsuits generates a 
great deal of procedural interest, but it also throws up many issues 
of substantive law.  To continue our comparative reference point, 
English legal scholars seem to allocate just as great a proportion of 
their scholarly efforts to civil litigation.  The difference is that 
English scholars are overwhelmingly drawn to writing about 
judges’ rulings on substantive law, rather than in the procedural 
questions the judges resolve along the way.  We find a somewhat 
more satisfying explanation for the greater American interest in 
procedure, however, when we add to our analysis the differing 
structures of the contrasting legal systems. 
In short, civil procedure matters more in America because 
authority over civil cases is divided among a greater number of 
different entities.125  Most procedural doctrine is concerned with 
delineating the boundaries between these entities.  In England, 
decision-making power is concentrated with a single, relatively 
homogeneous, group of judges.  Accordingly, there is often no real 
English equivalent to the procedural questions that provoke the 
most spirited debate in America; these concern the divisions of 
power among federal courts and the various state courts, and 
between judge and jury.  Benjamin Kaplan noticed this striking 
difference between English and American litigation after spending 
a few days in London’s Royal Courts of Justice.126  Kaplan 
                                                     
125 See MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 223 (photo. reprint 1991) (1986); 
Tamaruya, supra note 6, at 364 (unlike in England, “[t]he American procedure is 
overtly political not only in the sense that the politicians are actively involved but 
also in the sense that the debates on procedures concern the distribution of power 
among different decision-makers or different groups of people in the society.”).  
Relatedly, Atiyah and Summers note that “[b]y comparison with the English 
position, the United States has a veritable profusion of formal sources of law.”  
ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 89, at 55. 
126 Kaplan, supra note 6, at 821.  Kaplan noticed that procedural matters were 
largely resolved by masters rather than judges, and commented that “[o]ne 
connects the masters’ work with the fact that procedure in England has been put 
in the adjective or subordinate place where it seems to belong.”  Id. at 828. 
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suggested that civil procedure had a lesser place in England 
because “England is a legal unit without the complications of 
competency, jurisdiction, and venue that can bedevil an action in a 
federal system.”127 
For example, the horizontal allocation of sovereign power 
among the several states, along with geographic scale, largely 
accounts for the importance of personal jurisdiction questions in 
America.  For the most part, these issues arise when a plaintiff sues 
a defendant from one state in a court located in another state.128  As 
well as the sheer inconvenience of litigating in a far-flung place—
America is a big country—the defendant may be concerned that 
the plaintiff’s chosen forum will be less favorable to her than 
another.  For obvious reasons, these questions arise less often in 
England, where a greater proportion of litigation is conducted 
solely by parties from the single, unitary jurisdiction of England 
and Wales.129 
In the United States federal courts, the scope of federal 
jurisdiction is crucial in part because parties and observers rightly 
discern significant differences between federal judges (appointed 
by the President and confirmed by the Senate) and state-court 
judges (many of whom are elected or are at least subject to 
retention elections.)130  To take another example, the Erie doctrine is 
so important to American lawyers because it represents the federal 
courts’ attempt to define the area where they must defer to the 
                                                     
127 Id. 
128 Of course, some American personal jurisdiction cases involve defendants 
from outside the United States.  See supra note 67 (discussing McIntyre, an action 
brought in New Jersey against a defendant incorporated in England, and Asahi, a 
case brought in California against Japanese manufacturer). 
129 Procedural questions do loom large in the small, but important, field of 
transnational commercial litigation in England.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE COLLINS ET AL., 
DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (14th ed. 2008).  More 
broadly, in recent years, two rival court systems—the European Court of Human 
Rights and the courts of the European Union—have begun to chip away at the 
English courts system’s near-monopoly on adjudicative authority over English 
disputes.  But the contrast with the United States remains stark, especially because 
there are no European equivalents (yet) to the federal district courts.  The recent 
agreement for a unifed European patent court is an important indication of likely 
future moves towards more intrusive European Union authority over 
adjudication.  See Owen Bowcott, Unified Patent Court Split Between Paris, London 
and Munich, GUARDIAN, July 3, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/jul/ 
03/unified-patent-court-london. 
130 See JED SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
AND JUDICIAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012). 
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law-making authority of the several States.  Many other key topics 
in American civil procedure also draw their significance from the 
fact of judicial federalism, including the scope of federal court 
jurisdiction, the rules governing removal from state court to federal 
court in cases of jurisdiction, and the rules governing 
interjurisdictional preclusion.  That these questions have 
constitutional significance reinforces the prestige of the field. 
The importance of federalism to the American procedural 
system is even more obvious when one turns to the subject matter 
of the Federal Courts course.  The shifting extent of State sovereign 
immunity and Congress’s power to abrogate it are bound up with 
the tussle between national authority and the prerogatives of the 
States.  Studying the scope the United States Supreme Court’s 
power to review state court decisions similarly entails 
consideration of questions of federalism.  And much of the topic of 
abstention arises from the possibility of concurrent litigation in 
state and federal courts.131  Again, the subject of federal habeas 
corpus review of state-court criminal judgments exists because of 
the divided authority between state courts and federal courts.  
There is no equivalent form of review in England’s unitary legal 
system, where the only kind of judicial post-conviction relief is a 
new appeal within the same system.132  Indeed, two acute 
observers of the differences between England and America noted 
in 1987 that “[t]he whole concept of collateral attack is utterly alien 
to English lawyers, and indeed seems to them to be subversive of 
the authority of judicial decisions.”133 
                                                     
131 See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 588 
(1985) (discussing the various doctrines under which federal courts abstain from 
exercising their jurisdiction, and noting the need for federal courts to avoid 
“undue interference” with the states). 
132 See Criminal Justice Act, 1995, (A.S.P. 46) 51 & 52, c. 44 (Eng.) (indicating 
that under the current system for review of previously adjudicated criminal cases, 
the Criminal Cases Review Commission considers applications for post-
conviction review and refers cases to the Court of Appeal of England and Wales—
the same court to which an initial appeal goes in a serious criminal case). 
133 ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 89, at 217.  This statement is no longer true 
without qualification; collateral attack has gained ground in England since several 
miscarriages of justice came to light in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  See David 
Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1027, 1042 (2010) (“A number of high-profile exonerations in the 1980s and 
1990s raised concerns in the U.K. about the prevalence of wrongful convictions 
and the paucity of mechanisms to correct them.  In particular, the case of the 
“Birmingham Six”—six Irish men falsely convicted of bombing a pub in 
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Even once jurisdictional issues are settled, a major division of 
power remains in most American civil cases134 between judge and 
jury.135  This divide explains the relentless American scholarly 
focus on the standards for summary judgment.  Though American 
and English judges alike have the power to grant summary 
judgment rather than allowing the case to proceed to trial, the 
stakes are very different.  In England, the right to jury trial in civil 
cases has largely been abolished,136 so denying a motion for 
summary judgment means that the case goes to trial before a judge, 
usually the same judge who ruled on the summary judgment 
motion.  In the United States, the decision to deny summary 
judgment generally means that the case will be tried (if at all) to a 
jury.  Accordingly, the effect of the Supreme Court’s concerted 
                                                                                                                        
Birmingham—galvanized public opinion when their convictions were overturned 
in 1991.  In response, the British Home Secretary created a blue-ribbon panel, the 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, and charged it with the task of examining 
the causes of wrongful convictions and recommending better procedures for 
dealing with such miscarriages of justice.”); IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER 
(Universal Pictures 1993) (depicting a case similar to the Birmingham Six, that of 
the “Guildford Four”). 
134 Some American civil cases are tried to a judge alone, but in most, the 
parties have a constitutional right to a jury and the plaintiff asserts that right.  In 
the federal district courts, the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
protects the right to trial by jury in cases “at common law.”  The federal right does 
not apply in state court, but most states have similar constitutional protections for 
jury trial rights.  In this context and others, the constitutional element adds a 
certain element of glamour to American civil procedure. 
135 Though actual jury trials are rare, parties reach settlement agreements in 
the shadow of the jury.  See Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 7, 13 (2006) (“The promise of full-blown adjudication in a public forum, a 
‘day in court’ is increasingly redeemed by ‘bargaining in the shadow of the 
law.’”). 
136 See Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 69 (Eng.) (indicating that the right to 
trial by jury remains for defamation, false imprisonment, and malicious 
prosecution actions; however, even within the category of cases where a general 
right remains, a bench trial may be held where “the court is of the opinion that the 
trial requires any prolonged examination of documents or any scientific or local 
investigation which cannot be conveniently made with a jury”).  Though London 
is the “libel capital of the world,” and the parties in libel cases presumptively have 
a right to trial by jury, libel trials with juries are now rare.  Under proposed 
reforms, English civil juries may soon be a thing of the past.  See Josh Halliday, 
Removing Libel Juries Would Be Dangerous, Warns Newspaper Industry, GUARDIAN, 
May 11, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/may/11/libel-law-
defamation-reform (“The government’s draft bill, unveiled in March, signalled an 
end to the use of juries in all but exceptional circumstances.  The bill removes the 
presumption in favour of a jury trial as part of measures to cut costs and speed up 
court cases.”). 
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effort in the 1980s to make summary judgment more freely 
available to defendants in the federal courts137 was to reduce 
democratic participation in the civil justice system.138  One scholar 
has even asserted that the increased use of summary judgment in 
the federal courts violates plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to trial by 
jury.139  Summary judgment could not provoke such excitement in 
England. 
A distinctive feature of American litigation, its all-inclusive 
party-driven approach to discovery, is another instance of 
fragmentation of power within the litigation process.  And the 
pleading rules are so important in America because, once a 
plaintiff gets over the initial hurdle of a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim,140 she is entitled to demand from the 
                                                     
137 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (providing that a party is entitled to summary 
judgment where there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact”).  See also 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 316 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 572 
(1986) (the trilogy of cases in 1986 where the United States Supreme Court 
broadened access to summary judgment). 
138 See Paul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 79, 93 (2003) (“Citizen participation in the disposition of civil 
cases has been an important, indeed central, and perhaps critical, element in the 
development of the American legal system.”). 
139 See Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 139, 142 (2007) (“I conclude that summary judgment should be eliminated 
altogether because it is unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment.”). 
Typically, given the vibrant scholarly debate on civil procedure in America, 
Professor Thomas’s provocative article produced a flurry of responses.  See, e.g., 
Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment Is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1625, 1627 
(2008) (“[T]he argument that summary judgment is unconstitutional depends on a 
rigid, erroneous interpretation of the Seventh Amendment.”); William E. Nelson, 
Summary Judgment and the Progressive Constitution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1653 (2008) 
(arguing against an originalist interpretation of the Seventh Amendment).  For 
Professor Thomas’s reply, see Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Still 
Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professors Brunet and Nelson, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1667 
(2008). 
140 In an American federal court, though the filing of a motion to dismiss 
generally does not automatically stay the defendant’s discovery obligations, a 
successful motion to dismiss by the defendant will often intervene before the 
plaintiff has obtained substantial discovery.  See Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New 
Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 69 (2010) (“The rules say nothing specifically about 
the availability of discovery pending a motion to dismiss.  As an original matter, 
at least, the drafters probably did not contemplate the need for such discovery, for 
under the liberalized pleading standard of Rule 8, the assumption was that 
discovery would not be needed to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  
Twombly and Iqbal may change this dynamic, but it [is] not clear in what 
direction.”) 
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defendant, without judicial approval, any evidence that might be 
relevant to the case, and to conduct depositions of the defendant 
and of third-party witnesses.141  In England, with its more 
restrained approach to discovery, the stakes on a motion to strike 
out a claim are lower because, even if the defendant’s motion fails, 
the court still has the power to rein in unnecessary discovery 
demands.  It is easy to see why English scholars spend little time 
thinking about pleading, while, for Americans, it is often all-
important. 
Similar observations emerge from the comparative work of 
Masayuki Tamaruya on the very specific topic of “freezing 
injunctions”—pre-trial orders that restrain a defendant from 
dealing with assets in such a way as to avoid future execution of a 
later money judgment.142  Freezing injunctions are widely available 
in England,143 but the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that federal 
district courts lack the power to issue an equivalent form of relief—
partly because freezing injunctions were not traditionally available 
in English chancery practice at the time of American 
independence.144  While English practice evolved, the U.S. 
Supreme Court seemed to cling to an outmoded position in this 
fairly technical area of procedural doctrine.  Seeking an 
explanation for the contrasting approaches, Tamaruya finds the 
answer partly in the politicization of American civil procedure 
reform, which hinders the ability of judges to undertake explicit, 
                                                     
141 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (referring expressly to the 
“burdens of discovery” that would otherwise be imposed on the defendants when 
justifying the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim).  See also Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007) (“Asking for plausible grounds to infer an 
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it 
simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 
reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”). 
142 See Masayuki Tamaruya, The Anglo-American Perspective on Freezing 
Injunctions, 29 CIV. JUST. Q. 350, 350 (2010) (“Freezing injunctions have been 
adopted in most common law jurisdictions as an effective civil remedy to combat 
attempts by recalcitrant debtors or fraudsters to frustrate potential money 
judgments by use of ever faster methods of fund transfer.  The United States, 
however, provided a conspicuous exception.”). 
143 See Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v International Bulkcarriers S.A., 
[1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509 (A.C.) (establishing the English courts’ ability to grant 
freezing injunctions). 
144 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 
U.S. 308, 318 (1999) (“We must ask, therefore, whether the relief respondents 
requested here was traditionally accorded by courts of equity.”). 
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unilateral reform of civil procedure.145  In England, judges are able 
to go quietly and informally about the business of procedural 
reform, because “a few core members of the judiciary and the bar 
keep a firm grip on the reform of civil procedure.”146  American 
procedure, on the other hand, is “overtly political[,] not only in the 
sense that the politicians are actively involved but also in the sense 
that the debates on procedures concern the distribution of power 
among different decision-makers or different groups of people in 
the society.”147 
5. PROCEDURE AND THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 
Still, even these differences do not fully explain American 
exceptionalism in the focus on procedure. Certainly, it makes sense 
that procedural questions should occupy a somewhat greater 
proportion of the energies of American legal scholars.  But these 
explanations fail to account for (what must seem to English eyes) 
the scale of American obsession with procedure or (what must 
seem to American eyes) an extraordinary degree of apathy about 
procedural law in the English legal academy.  Civil procedure 
remains marginal in England even though large-scale reforms in 
the last fifteen years must surely have had profound effects on the 
outcomes of cases, the structure of the legal professions, and the 
behavior of citizens subject to the substantive law that legal 
scholars continue to focus on.  Moreover, that America “does 
more” with litigation and disperses power among different actors 
may, in part, be symptoms rather than just causes of American 
legal culture’s fascination with procedure.  Consequently, I 
propose that we seek deeper reasons for the divergence, embedded 
in the history of law and legal thought in the two countries.  When 
one takes a historical turn in procedure, the comparison between 
American law and English law is particularly apt, and, I think, 
especially revealing. 
I show in this Section that there is a strong connection between 
the rise of Legal Realism and the prominence of legal procedure in 
America.  I do not mean to say simply that Legal Realism “caused” 
                                                     
145 In reality, as the Iqbal and Twombly cases show, the Supreme Court has 
been willing to make new procedural law under cover of “interpreting” the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
146 Tamaruya, supra note 142, at 363. 
147 Id. 
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American proceduralism, though that appears to be partly true.  To 
the extent that there is a causal relationship, it may well be 
mutual—proceduralism may encourage realism and vice versa.  I 
tell the comparative story in the following way.  First, I explain that 
legal theorists in both England and America embraced substantive 
law more and more as the nineteenth century progressed, 
relegating procedure to a minor place in the burgeoning legal 
academies of both countries.  Indeed, the period around the turn of 
the twentieth century can fairly be described as a period of 
intellectual unity between the legal elites of England and 
America,148 a unity that included a shared belief in “legal science” 
and the primacy of substantive law.  However, when Legal 
Realism swept through the American law schools, the common-
law consensus broke down.  As part of the rupture between 
England and America, American scholars and the lawyers whose 
minds they shaped attached a greater degree of importance to the 
realities of law-application, at the expense of their erstwhile 
concentration on the conceptual coherence of substantive law.  
England did not have a Realist revolution, and also has never fully 
embraced civil procedure as a worthy field of academic study.  In 
the ensuing decades, the structure of English legal education has 
helped to entrench the substantive-law focus of English legal 
academia, holding back the encroachment of procedural ideas into 
the domain of substance. 
5.1. The Dominance of Procedural Categories Until the Late-
Eighteenth Century 
Though it is possible to look back and classify centuries of 
common-law practice in substantive law terms,149 that way of 
thinking came surprisingly late in the history of common-law 
thought.  Looking back on the previous centuries from a 
nineteenth-century perspective, Maine stated that “substantive law 
has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of 
                                                     
148 See RICHARD A. COSGROVE, OUR LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL COMMUNITY, 1870–1930, at 66 (1987) (noting that, by the 1880s 
“the interpretation of the United States as a worthy offspring of England had 
gained respectability among Victorian intellectuals.”). 
149 David Ibbeston’s book on the history of the common law of contract, tort, 
and unjust enrichment is a self-conscious attempt to find substantive principles of 
law in the practices of more procedurally minded lawyers.  DAVID J. IBBETSON, A 
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (1999). 
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procedure.”150  And procedural categories dominated legal thought 
for intensely practical reasons.  One grand procedural divide was 
the distinction between courts of law and courts of equity.  Within 
the common-law courts, eighteenth-century lawyers still organized 
their thinking around the forms of action.  In essence, a form of 
action was a verbal formula the courts would recognize as an 
appropriate means of starting a particular kind of case.151  In real 
property cases, for example, the plaintiff had to choose between a 
writ of right, an assize of novel disseisein, and an action in 
ejectment.  In the contractual setting, an action of assumpsit would 
usually do the trick, but the actions of debt or covenant remained a 
possibility.  And so on. 
The forms of action, bogged down by steady accretion of 
technical learning, provided the prism through which common 
lawyers saw the law.  The result of choosing the wrong form of 
action could be severe: if the court found that the plaintiff’s case 
did not fall within the requirement of the chosen form, the case 
might be dismissed with prejudice to bringing the action in another 
form.  In addition, the particular form of action sometimes dictated 
the proper court where the action could be brought.  Moreover, 
different forms of action entailed different ways of serving process 
on the defendant, different potential prejudgment remedies, and 
differing availability of default judgment.  The chosen form of 
action also affected the defendant’s pleading obligations, the mode 
of trial (Jury or judge?  If a jury, what form of jury?), and the kind 
of post-judgment remedies available. 
The courts sometimes allowed the law to develop by indulging 
legal fictions: once the court accepted the fiction, a plaintiff could 
use a form of action to bring his suit even though he could not 
really establish one of its elements.152  Common-law lawyers in the 
late-eighteenth century spent vast amounts of energy deploying 
                                                     
150 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 
(Arno Press 1975) (1883). 
151 In 1829, the Common Law Commissioners identified seventeen different 
ways of commencing an action in the common-law courts in England.  ROYAL 
COMM’N ON THE COMMON LAW, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON THE 
PRACTICE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF COMMON LAW (1829), 
reprinted in 9 IRISH UNIVERSITY PRESS SERIES OF BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 72–4 
(P. Ford & G. Ford eds., 1970). 
152 Bentham detected “the pestilential breath of fiction” everywhere in 
English law.  JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A 
FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 411 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977). 
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and debating the applicability of arbitrary rules, rather than on the 
substance of the parties’ dispute or the justice of their cases.  
Procedural wrangling is perhaps an inherent part of any system of 
laws and courts—a price we pay for subjecting human behavior in 
a complex society to rules detailed enough to usefully guide 
conduct and fetter official discretion.  By the late-eighteenth 
century, however, the common law had plainly lost its bearings. 
5.2. The Nineteenth-Century Rise of Substance 
The substance-procedure distinction began to emerge from 
late-eighteenth-century rationalizations of the common law 
through the works of two great adversaries, William Blackstone 
and Jeremy Bentham.  If nothing else, Blackstone and Bentham 
shared a desire to impose some kind of analytical rigor on the 
common law.  Blackstone, drawing on the civil law tradition, 
aimed to uncover the rights and wrongs recognized by English 
law, as distinct from the methods for enforcing them.153  
Accordingly, his Commentaries were partly responsible for 
developing a division between substance and procedure.154  But it 
was Bentham who made the substance-procedure distinction 
explicit.155  “Laws prescribing the course of procedure,” Bentham 
said, “have . . . been characterized by the term adjective laws, in 
contradistinction to those other laws . . . [that] have been 
                                                     
153 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 35 
(1765–69) (explaining that the common law should be viewed as setting forth “a 
general map of the law”); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND (1756) (providing a critical analysis of English laws and their basis). 
154 See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 
WASH. L. REV. 429, 458-60 (2003) (exploring Blackstone’s introduction of substance 
and procedure as fundamentally different concepts); Stephen N. Subrin, How 
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical 
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 929–30 (1987) (“Blackstone atomized the study 
of law by separating not only rights from wrongs, but also the methods of 
enforcement from both.”). 
155 See D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and “Procedure” Revisited with Some 
Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions,” 30 UCLA 
L. REV. 189, 191 (1982) (“The dichotomy was fathered by Jeremy Bentham in a 
1782 work entitled Of Laws in General, sub nom the distinction between substantive 
law and adjective law.”).  Of Laws in General was substantially completed in 1782 
but was not discovered until 1939.  See JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL, at 
xxxi (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970) (noting that the work was unknown until 1939 when 
it was discovered by Professor Charles Warren Everett at University College 
London). 
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characterized by the correspondent opposite term, substantive 
laws.”156 
Bentham did not wish merely to draw an analytic distinction 
between substance and procedure.  Indeed, his very terminology 
suggested that procedure should be merely adjectival.  Bentham 
sought to “degrade procedure from its prior position of equality in 
the legal enterprise to a position subordinate to the substantive 
law.”157  The substance-procedure distinction took hold both in his 
own country and in the newly-independent United States.   So, too, 
did Bentham’s desire to sweep away anachronistic procedural 
technicalities, and his belief in the central importance of 
substantive law, rather than procedure. 
5.2.1. English Procedural Reform and the Rise of Substantive 
Legal Categories  
In the early-nineteenth century, the life of English law was still 
governed by the forms of action, and the jurisdictional divide 
between law and equity remained intact.  But as the nineteenth 
century progressed, dissatisfaction with the writ system and other 
pleading technicalities grew.  Bentham’s relentless critiques of the 
common law, though extreme, struck a chord in Victorian England.  
Reform-minded lawyers chafed at a system of writs whose 
boundaries owed more to accidents of history than any rational 
scheme of organization.  More and more, those who sought to 
rationalize the law—the treatise-writers—organized their works 
around “scientific” substantive categories rather than the 
discredited forms of action.158 
                                                     
156 JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, WITH THE OUTLINES OF 
A PROCEDURE CODE, reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 5 (John Bowring 
ed., 1843); see also Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1231 
n.10, 1240 (2001) (“It was Jeremy Bentham who made the distinction between 
substantive law and procedure . . . prominent. . . . This new conceptual distinction 
helped Bentham . . . make the case that English law remained intellectually and 
practically incoherent because substantive legal rights and duties were learned and 
classified for practice under the jumbled array of procedural forms that had grown 
up over the centuries to enforce them.”). 
157 Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., “There’ll Always Be an England”: The Instrumental 
Ideology of Evidence, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1204, 1213 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM 
TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985)). 
158 See A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles 
and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632 (1981) (exploring the 
predominance of the view that law was a science amongst treatise writers). 
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In England, Parliament abolished the forms of action over a 
forty-year period in the nineteenth century in a series of legislative 
acts aimed at simplifying common-law procedure.  It was not until 
the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 that the forms of action were 
finally buried and common-law procedure was reduced, in 
essence, to a single form of action.  The Judicature Acts also 
lessened the effect of another major procedural divide—the 
distinction between the courts of common law and the courts of 
equity.  Though courts took pains to make clear that only the 
administration of law and equity were fused, rather than the bodies 
of substantive law that were previously administered in the 
separate courts, administrative fusion obviously lessened the 
importance of what was once a grand jurisdictional divide.159 
The abolition of the forms of action was partly a result of the 
rise of substantive legal thought, and once the forms were out of 
the way, substantive categories rose to the fore.  These categories 
were preeminently based on legal theory (contract, tort, property), 
but there were also some contextual categories (commercial paper, 
marine insurance).  The Judicature Acts aided the process by 
bringing about “the ultimate separation of substantive law from 
procedure,” which “made possible the belief . . . that legal rights 
and obligations are one thing, the machinery and procedures for 
their recognition and enforcement another.”160 
The dramatic lessening of importance in procedure in the life of 
English lawyers coincided with the emergence of the university 
legal scholar in England.  The great “rationalization” of the legal 
system loosened procedure’s grip on the common-law legal mind, 
but civil procedure was still of great moment to practicing lawyers, 
as always.  What was different was that those who taught and 
produced scholarship about English law began to neglect civil 
procedure as a field of study.  For the most part, those with 
positions on the newly-emerging English law faculties had little or 
no practical experience.  Their ideas were inspired by Roman and 
                                                     
159 Though the administration of law and equity is fused, English lawyers 
continue to observe a more rigorous separation between common-law and 
equitable ideas than American courts.  The process of fusion continues today, to 
the impatience of some scholars.  See Andrew Burrows, We Do This at Common Law 
but That in Equity, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002) (arguing that lawyers should 
do more to bring together common law and equity). 
160 J.A. Jolowicz, ‘General Ideas’ and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 295, 300 (1983). 
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German legal theorists, and many appear to have considered 
procedure beneath them.  Substance was king. 
Speaking to law students at the University of Cambridge on the 
forms of action at the end of the nineteenth century, F.W. Maitland 
recognized that he was swimming against the tide in asking 
students of English law to focus on procedure rather than 
substance: 
It may—I am well aware of it—be objected that procedure 
is not a good theme for academic discussion.  Substantive 
law should come first—adjective law, procedural law, 
afterwards.  The former may perhaps be studied in a 
University, the latter must be studied in chambers.161 
Though Maitland disagreed profoundly with this way of 
thinking—claiming famously that the forms of action “still rule us 
from their graves”—he recognized that it represented the 
dominant way of thinking among England’s still-embryonic 
university law faculties. 
5.2.2. American Procedural Reform and the Rise of Substantive 
Legal Categories  
Like their English counterparts, American lawyers—to the 
extent they imported the complex body of procedural learning 
developed in the King’s courts—grew discontented with the forms 
of action as the nineteenth century progressed.162 
The most significant nineteenth-century procedural reform to 
result from this dissatisfaction was the Field Code of 1848, some 
form of which was adopted in more than half the States.163  The 
Code, devised by David Dudley Field and the New York 
Commission on Practice and Pleading, was inspired by the 
                                                     
161 F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: ALSO, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: 
TWO COURSES OF LECTURES 294 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1913).  
162 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE 
IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830 (1975); Paul D. 
Carrington, Teaching Civil Procedure: A Retrospective View, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 
317 (1999) (“Among those sharing Bentham’s scorn of common law procedure 
were Jacksonians, who regarded English procedure as just another burden the 
aristocracy imposed on honest folk as a means of preserving the wealth and status 
of lawyers.”). 
163 See Subrin, supra note 154, at 931–39 (describing the Field Code’s attempt 
to merge common law and equity). 
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Benthamite tradition of legal reform, which prized legislative 
arrangement over common-law development.  Most significantly, 
the Field Code merged the administration of law and equity, and it 
rejected the forms of action.  Plaintiffs and defendants would now 
be required to plead relevant facts satisfying the elements of a 
substantive law cause of action, rather than recite the apposite 
procedural verbal formula.  Field, of course, was a proceduralist, 
but, like Bentham, his ultimate aim was to demote procedure from 
its previously privileged place.  In keeping with the growing focus 
on substance, Field viewed procedure as a kind of tool in the 
service of the substantive law; he aimed to remove obstacles to the 
“swift, economic, and predictable enforcement of discrete, 
carefully articulated rights.”164  (Field also helped to devise a Code 
of substantive law, which was never enacted.) 
The process of procedural reform in America was more 
complex than in England because each system of civil justice, state 
and federal, proceeded at its own pace.  But as American reformers 
left the forms of action and the law-equity split behind, they 
cleared the way for scholars in the law schools to focus their 
energies on substantive law.  In this respect, American scholars 
were similar to their English counterparts, with whom they 
regarded as forming a joint enterprise.  Many American law 
professors even regarded themselves as teachers of English law, 
which they often referred to as “our law”—that “common law” 
being the newly rationalized substantive law of contracts, torts, 
and property.  Langdell’s first casebook, A Selection of Cases on the 
Law of Contracts, is dominated by English cases—310 of 336 cases 
were from the English courts.165  Langdell was less concerned with 
teaching students how courts work than with helping them to 
derive and apply the small number of fundamental principles 
underpinning private law subjects.166 
                                                     
164 Id. at 935. 
165 C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871).  I 
take the numbers from E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the 
Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1406, 1439–40 (1987) (suggesting that cultural 
Anglophilia and the desire to present a unified body of doctrine motivated 
Langdell’s selection of cases). 
166 See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983) 
(“Langdell believed that through scientific methods lawyers could derive correct 
legal judgments from a few fundamental principles and concepts . . . .”). 
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It would be a mistake to caricature the formalism of the late-
nineteenth-century Anglo-American elite legal community.  Legal 
scholars of the period still sometimes relied on policy arguments at 
the margins.  But taking “formalism” as an ideal type rather than 
as a description of any particular scholar, the conclusion remains 
sound: the period was a high-point for the idea that legal reasoning 
was autonomous from instrumental concerns.  Langdell is—
perhaps unfairly167—characterized as an extreme exponent of the 
“formalism” of the era, but, in any event, his view of civil 
procedure was representative of the growing focus on substantive 
law.  In fact, in one sense, Langdell viewed civil procedure 
instrumentally.  As Thomas Grey says, “[a]s a classical legal 
scientist [Langdell] regarded procedure as instrumental to the 
enforcement of substantive, scientifically ascertained rights; 
procedure was thus a kind of technology in the service of legal 
science.”168  Thus, procedural rules and doctrines were 
instrumental, not to broader social goals, but to substantive legal 
rights that were ends in themselves. 
As Holmes famously said in a review of Langdell’s contracts 
casebook, Langdell elevated “logic” over “experience.”169  But 
Holmes, too, was a product of his time, and he exhibited a certain 
disdain for procedure, particularly in his earlier work.  At the very 
beginning of his lectures on the common law, he distinguished 
between substance and procedure, identifying the latter with 
history and anachronism: “The substance of the law at any given 
time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then 
understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the 
                                                     
167 Bruce Kimball’s work challenges much of the received wisdom about 
Langdell.  See, e.g., BRUCE KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL 
EDUCATION: C. C. LANGDELL, 1826–1906 (2009); Bruce A. Kimball, Langdell on 
Contracts and Legal Reasoning: Correcting the Holmesian Caricature, 25 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 345 (2007).  The picture that emerges from Kimball’s extensive scholarship is 
more nuanced than the picture of Langdell painted by Holmes, Frank, and 
Gilmore.  According to Kimball, Langdell’s mode of legal reasoning was “three 
dimensional, exhibiting a comprehensive yet contradictory integration of 
induction from authority, deduction from principle, and analysis of acceptability, 
including justice and policy.”  Id. at 390.  Still, Langdell should plainly be 
distinguished from the Legal Realists, for whom “justice and policy” came first 
and last. 
168 Grey, supra note 166, at 14 n.50. 
169 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Review, 14. AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) 
(reviewing C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, WITH 
A SUMMARY OF THE TOPICS COVERED BY THE CASES (2d ed. 1879)). 
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degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very 
much upon its past.”170  Holmes’s aim in The Common Law was to 
bypass procedure, and to find the substantive principles of torts, 
contracts, property, and crimes lurking below the procedural 
surface. 
Though Langdell followed the general mood in relegating 
procedural doctrines to a secondary role, his curriculum did have a 
place for civil procedure.171  In this respect, the American law 
schools diverged from the English universities.  Despite Langdell’s 
non-instrumental vision of substantive law, his Harvard Law 
School purported to be a professional school training lawyers for 
practice.  Fittingly, then, the required courses for Harvard law 
students, along with the core substantive courses of Contract, Tort, 
Property, Equity, and Criminal Law, included a course in Civil 
Procedure.172  Langdell, who had substantial practical experience 
with the Field Code as a New York lawyer, taught three procedure 
courses himself: the required course in “Civil Procedure at 
Common Law,”173 and two electives, one in “Civil Procedure 
under the New York Code” and the other in “Process, Arrest, and 
Bail.”  However, perhaps reflecting the general mood, few students 
took the elective procedural courses, and the courses were 
                                                     
170 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1–2 (1881); see also id. at 
253 (“[W]henever we trace a leading doctrine of substantive law far enough back, 
we are very likely to find some forgotten circumstance of procedure at its 
source.”). 
171 See Bruce A. Kimball, Students’ Choices and Experience During the Transition 
to Competitive Academic Achievement at Harvard Law School, 1876–1882, 55 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 163, 172 (2005) (displaying a student’s first-year schedule in 1876, which 
included a course in civil procedure taught by Langdell).  See also Bruce Kimball & 
Pedro Reyes, The “First Modern Civil Procedure Course,” as Taught by C.C. Langdell, 
1870–78, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 258 (2005) (noting that the “principles and 
characteristics of the ‘modern civil procedure course’ . . . include . . . [a] focus on 
the procedural rather than substantive issues of cases”). 
172 Langdell seems to have renamed the course “Civil Procedure.”  See 
Kimball & Reyes, supra note 171, at 268.  Previous courses at Harvard were 
entitled “Pleading.”  Id. 
173 The required class—taught first by Langdell and continued by James Barr 
Ames until 1905—was a course in common-law pleading in England under the 
forms of action before 1830.  This curricular choice is not quite as bizarre as it 
might seem.  See Kimball & Reyes, supra note 171, at 259 (noting, among other 
reasons, that common-law pleading persisted in many American jurisdictions 
when Langdell taught). 
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discontinued in 1878.  More generally, the pleading course was 
given “only a minor place in the Langdell curriculum.”174 
5.2.3. The Transatlantic Triumph of Substantive Law 
To sum up: the nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable 
intellectual shift in the way that lawyers in the common-law 
tradition organized the law.  At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, substance and procedure were almost inseparable.  
Scholars and leading lawyers, however, disengaged substantive 
law from procedure, and relegated procedure to a subservient role.  
The need for procedural reform was an important element of legal 
debates in both America and England; to that extent, the 
nineteenth century was a century of proceduralism.  But the 
dominant aim of reformers was to make procedure unimportant, to 
approach a utopian state of affairs where procedure no longer 
hindered substantive law.  American lawyer Thomas Shelton used 
various metaphors to explain the subservient role that procedure 
ought to play, contending that legal procedure should be “a clean 
pipe,” “an unclogged artery, a clear viaduct,” or “a bridge.”175  
That sentiment was widely shared by legal scholars throughout the 
Anglo-American legal community. 
5.3. Procedure’s Revival in Twentieth-Century America 
In one respect, however, Langdell provided a foundation for 
the later rise of civil procedure.  When American law schools 
replicated the Harvard curricular model of legal education—
which, in many ways, remains dominant—they also adopted the 
course in Pleading or Civil Procedure.  Langdell’s curriculum, 
then, provided a beachhead for a different kind of American 
intellectual interest in the subject.  Much like the case method of 
                                                     
174 Carrington, supra note 162, at 321 (stating that “[i]t is as well” Langdell 
gave the pleading course “only a minor place in the curriculum” because, at the 
time, Ames taught “the rigors” of England’s Hillary Rules, which “proved to be 
disastrous in practice and were repealed in 1852”).   
175 THOMAS WALL SHELTON, SPIRIT OF THE COURTS 17, 32, 72 (1918), quoted in 
Janice Toran, ‘Tis a Gift to Be Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural Reform, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 352, 374–75 (1990) (“Thomas Shelton, who admired Pound, came to share 
Pound’s view of procedure.  Shelton envisioned a procedure separate from, but 
facilitative of, substantive law.  He likened procedure to a clean pipe, an 
unclogged artery, a clear viaduct, or a bridge.”). 
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instruction, the civil procedure course was later used for decidedly 
non-Langdellian purposes. 
The rising early-twentieth-century Legal Realist mood 
prompted civil procedure’s move back from an adjectival position 
to a central one in American legal thought.  As a multifaceted 
movement, Legal Realism was many things, but the Realists shared 
at least two positions—one negative, the other constructive.  First, 
Realists denied a major premise of Langdellian legal science—that 
judges could deduce answers from a small number of principles of 
substantive law.  Second, Realists agreed that law is an instrument 
to be used in the service of social ends.176  This functionalism led 
the Realists—in their attempts at reconstructive projects—to think 
systematically about the consequences of legal rules and practices.  
Procedures could not, for the Realists, be simply an instrument 
toward the enforcement of substantive law because substantive 
law rules were not ends in themselves; to the extent that one could 
distinguish between both procedural and substantive law rules, 
both kinds should advance social goals.  In the end, the Realists 
made little progress toward a satisfying account of what those 
social goals might be.  But in seeking to uncover law’s instrumental 
functions, and assessing law’s contribution to them, Realist 
scholars were naturally inclined to give serious attention to 
procedure as a subject in its own right.177 
For these purposes—though not for others—Roscoe Pound 
deserves to be classified with the Realists.  In his call for a new 
kind of legal scholarship, Roscoe Pound asserted that law “must be 
judged by the results it achieves, not by the niceties of its internal 
structure,”178 and that “[t]he life of the law is in its enforcement.”179  
                                                     
176 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF 
LAW ch. 4 (2006).  The phrase “law as a means to an end” derives from the work of 
the enormously significant nineteenth-century German scholar Rudolf von 
Ihering.  See RUDOLF VON IHERING, DER ZWECK IM RECHT (1877); RUDOLF VON 
IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaac Husik trans., Augustus M. Kelley 
Publishers 1968) (1913). 
177 There is an element of paradox in the fact that Bentham, the archetypal 
instrumentalist, is responsible in large part for the nineteenth-century rise of 
substance.  The answer to this paradox, I think, is that Bentham was reacting to 
the particularly insufferable body of procedural practices that characterized the 
late-eighteenth-century common law. 
178 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605 (1908) 
(“Law is not scientific for the sake of science.  Being scientific as a means toward 
an end, it must be judged by the results it achieves, not by the niceties of its 
internal structure . . . .”). 
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Pound, a brilliantly insightful observer of trends in legal thought, 
diagnosed the new hegemony of substantive law categories in the 
minds of American legal scholars.180  Unsurprisingly, given his 
commitment to understanding the social effects of legal rules and 
institutions, Pound decried this trend, and called for scholars to 
pay more attention to procedure.  As Jay Tidmarsh has shown, 
Pound “understood that procedure was about something 
important.  It was a critical dimension of his larger theory of law, 
and was a central component of his program for systematic legal 
reform.”181  In a famous speech to the American Bar Association,182 
Pound reignited the movement for procedural reform,183 which 
eventually culminated in the promulgation of the new Federal 
Rules three decades later. 
In this respect, Pound’s intellectual commitment to civil 
procedure unites him with later, unambiguous members of the 
Legal Realist “movement.”  Karl Llewellyn named as one of the 
movement’s emergent achievements that “[s]tudy has been 
attempted of ‘substantive rules’ in the particular light of the 
available remedial procedure.”184  “Everything that you know of 
procedure,” Karl Llewellyn advised beginning law students, “you 
must carry into every substantive course.  You must read each 
substantive course, so to speak, through the spectacles of that 
procedure.  For what substantive law says should be means 
nothing except in terms of what procedure says that you can make 
real.”185 
                                                                                                                        
179 Id. at 619 (“The life of the law is in its enforcement.”). 
180 Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. 
L. REV. 489, 514 (1912) (claiming that the “study of the means of making legal rules 
effective . . . has been neglected almost entirely in the past”). 
181 Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 574 
(2006). 
182 Roscoe Pound, THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 29 REP. A.B.A. 395 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 
(1964). 
183 See Carrington, supra note 162, 321–27.  As Carrington suggests, “[t]he 
teaching of civil procedure received a powerful impulse from the Progressive 
era.”  Id. at 321. 
184 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1244 (1930). 
185 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 17-18 
(1951). 
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Like Pound, the Legal Realists characteristically viewed law as 
achieving social ends or solving social problems.  On this 
conception of the function of law, legal scholars would need to 
think systematically about procedure to assess the law’s actual 
contributions to those ends, or solving those problems.  The more 
radical forms of Realism—in particular, Jerome Frank’s skepticism 
about the very process of fact-finding186—challenged head-on the 
basic assumption that procedure could possibly be the servant of 
substantive law.  
The arch-Realist Thurman Arnold, in his 1932 article The Role of 
Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process, made explicit the 
way Realists thought about procedure.187  Arnold’s article is 
probably the clearest attack on the Langdellian legal academy’s 
privileging of substance over procedure.  By that time, Arnold 
could refer to “our modern skepticism about substantive law”188—
the possessive here referring to Legal Realists—even though the 
idea of substantive law was itself of recent vintage.  Arnold 
recognized that judges, in order to maintain their power, were 
obligated to “talk of substantive law as a scientific body of 
principles which govern society.”189  He argued that a “shift of 
emphasis from doctrines to courts needs to be made if we are 
either to understand, reform, or restate any part of our judicial 
system.”190 
Arnold identified fundamental differences between the ways 
that the preceding generation of scholars and lawyers had thought 
about substantive law, on the one hand, and procedure, on the 
other.  Substantive law, for Langdell and those who shared his 
assumptions, was “sacred and fundamental”; procedure was 
simply a matter of detail.191  Substantive law, on the view Arnold 
criticized, might be “restated,” but it never needed reform because 
                                                     
186 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). 
187 See Arnold, supra note 12. 
188 Id. at 618. 
189 Id. (claiming that the construction of a “science of substantive law” was a 
method for avoiding the implication that judicial decisions were grounded in 
personal and arbitrary elements, and for maintaining the power and prestige of an 
independent judiciary). 
190 Id. at 619. 
191 Id. at 643 (discussing how substantive law and procedural law are treated 
differently, even though one could label some laws as either substantive law or as 
procedural).  
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“its fundamental verities can always be discovered by logical 
analysis.”192  By contrast, on the orthodox view, procedural reform 
could be accomplished by looking to the “problem involved.”  But 
for Arnold, the substance-procedure distinction was only a matter 
of attitude, and entirely manipulable.  “Substantive law is 
canonized procedure.  Procedure is unfrocked substantive law.”193  
Arnold called on his fellow Realists to recast substantive legal rules 
as procedural problems to support the effort to reform them. 
Tellingly for the purposes of this Article, Arnold chose the 
work of Arthur Goodhart—a New Yorker in origin but a decidedly 
English legal scholar—as an exemplar of those who divided 
substantive law and procedure into fundamentally different 
categories.194  Goodhart approached “substantive law”—such 
notions as contracts and torts—in a manner completely different 
from procedural questions like the assessment of attorney’s fees 
under the “loser pays” rule.  On Goodhart’s account, substantive 
law was fundamental, part of the “science of law.”195  The 
assessment of attorney’s fees, by contrast, was “treated [by 
Goodhart] as a practical problem to which no methodology of the 
discovery of principles scientifically arrived at is necessary.”196 
Arnold’s efforts to problematize the procedure-substance 
distinction were in the service of grand goals: to depart from 
traditional “formalist” ways of thought and convince judges to 
tolerate the New Deal’s coming embrace of bureaucratic forms of 
governance.  Other Realists explored the fluid substance-procedure 
boundary in more conventional doctrinal terms.  One obvious 
context was the conflict of laws, a staple law school course in 
                                                     
192 Id. at 643. 
193 Id. at 645. 
194 After an undergraduate degree at Yale, Goodhart studied law at 
Cambridge University, and then “spent nearly all his working life” in Britain.  See 
Tony Honoré, Goodhart, Arthur Lehman, in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL 
BIOGRAPHY (rev. 2004) (chronicling Goodhart’s legal studies and relationship with 
Cambridge University). 
195 For Goodhart’s views on substantive law, Arnold refers to Arthur L. 
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930), 
reprinted in ARTHUR L. GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW 
(1931).  
196 Arnold, supra note 12 at 635 (differentiating between applying rules with 
attitude induced by the science of law and applying rules with the attitude of an 
administrative official).  Here, Arnold appears to be referring to Arthur L. 
Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929), reprinted in GOODHART, ESSAYS, supra note 
195. 
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multi-jurisdictional America.  An axiom of the field as developed 
by “vested rights” theorists like Joseph Beale was that the forum 
should apply its own procedural rules, leaving substantive law as 
the domain for conflicts doctrine.197  But the courts drew criticism 
from formalist scholars for their lack of consistency in 
distinguishing between rules of substantive law and procedural 
rules.198  A particular rule—a rule allocating the burden of proof, a 
limitations period, a rule for calculating damages—might be 
deemed substantive in one doctrinal context yet procedural in 
another. 
Writing the year after Arnold, Walter Wheeler Cook set his 
sights on the “the tacit assumption that the supposed ‘line’ 
between the two categories [of ‘substantive law’ and ‘procedural’ 
law] has some kind of objective existence.”199  In a characteristic 
Realist move, Cook contended that the boundary between 
substance and procedure varied legitimately depending on the 
purpose for which the courts were drawing the distinction.  
Identifying eight such purposes,200 Cook invited lawyers to 
abandon the forlorn search for a single conceptual truth about the 
procedure-substance distinction, and instead examine the different 
value judgments at stake in each instance. 
By the time Erie brought the substance-procedure distinction to 
prominence, then, American lawyers were already beginning to 
develop a more mature understanding of procedural questions.  In 
the same year that the Supreme Court decided Erie, the new 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ushered in a new era, finally 
reforming the federal courts, freeing them from many ancient 
technicalities.  The primary drafter of the Federal Rules was 
Charles E. Clark, a self-identified Legal Realist.201  The flexible, 
                                                     
197 See, e.g., HERBERT FUNK GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (1927) (“Matters 
of remedy, or procedure, then, are determined by the law of the forum.  The 
general statement is not disputed; the difficulty comes in determining, on a 
concrete set of facts, into which class the case involved falls.”). 
198 See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATION AND FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS (2d ed. 1995). 
199 Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 
42 YALE L.J. 333, 335–36 (1933) (describing difficulties with determining which side 
of the line many rules fall). 
200 Id. at 341–43. 
201 See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal 
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 80 
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discretionary approach the drafters brought to procedural design 
rested on Realist premises.  Under Clark’s philosophy, procedural 
rules were instruments for achieving social functions.202  As David 
Marcus has recently argued, “[m]any of the Federal Rules, as well 
as the procedural architecture they provide civil litigation, quite 
neatly match the sort of reforms Clark championed in a corpus of 
scholarship that outlined a realist vision for procedure.”203  
Procedural rules, for Clark, were the handmaid of justice,204 not the 
handmaid of a body of black-letter substantive law. 
Legal Realism transformed American legal thought, even for 
those who purported to reject it.  The post-war Legal Process 
school was in part a response to Legal Realism, but it also accepted 
a key Realist tenet: the importance of procedure.205 
“[P]roceduralism became the favored response to what some 
considered the ‘nihilism’ of legal realism.”206  Legal Process 
scholars sought to divert attention from substantive rules to the 
allocation of decision-making power; among Hart and Sacks’ key 
tenets was that procedural understandings, including the 
allocations of decision-making authority, were “more fundamental 
than . . . substantive arrangements.”207  For Legal Process theorists, 
                                                                                                                        
(1989) (“[Clark was] perhaps the single most important figure in the drafting of 
the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
202 David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a 
Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433 (2010) (analyzing the influence of 
Legal Realism on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in particular the work 
of Charles E. Clark). 
203 Id. at 441 (noting Clark’s belief in harmony between Realist jurisprudence 
and the Federal Rules’ procedural reforms). 
204 Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297 (1938).  The 
title of the article derives from the statement of a senior English judge, who said 
that “the relation of rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of 
handmaid rather than mistress.”  Re Coles and Ravenshear, [1907] 1 K.B. 1, 4 
(Collins, M.R.). 
205 See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American 
Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601 (1993) (stressing continuities between Legal 
Realism and Legal Process thought). 
206 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy 
Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 170–71 (2006) (noting that both 
proceduralism and legal realism raise controversial questions of morality and 
policy). 
207 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart 
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“[t]he study of procedure is central to understanding law, because 
rational procedures facilitate the ability of positive law to be 
implemented in a way consistent with reason and natural law.”208  
Hart and Wechsler, who designed the Federal Courts class that 
continues to draw the most ambitious law students, were 
archetypal Legal Process thinkers. 
In her recent article on the United States Supreme Court’s 
response to “war-on-terror” litigation, Jenny Martinez has stressed 
the importance of Legal Process thought to contemporary 
American legal culture.  As Martinez notes, in the American legal 
academy—more than elsewhere—“there is enduring (and not 
entirely unwarranted) appeal in the promise that if we can just 
figure out a good process for making decisions, the hard policy 
questions of the time will be resolved correctly.”209  I would add, 
however, that the roots of Legal Process lay in the Legal Realist 
challenge to the autonomy of legal reasoning about substantive 
rights and duties.210  But it is not just that Legal Realism provoked 
Legal Process; Legal Realists themselves were proceduralists, at 
least in the broad sense of the word as I have used it.  As more 
conservative elements in the legal academy adopted procedural 
responses to a movement that demanded attention to procedure, 
the importance of procedure to America became firmly 
entrenched.211 
                                                                                                                        
and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 964 (1994) (“[Q]uestions of how 
decision-making authority should be allocated are of foremost importance.”). 
208 Eskridge, supra note 53, at 964 (identifying the importance of rational 
procedure as the focus of the Hart and Sacks tradition). 
209 Martinez, supra note 2, at 1064. 
210 See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 176, at 102–07; Fallon, supra note 207, at 
970 (“[Legal Process methodology] substantially addressed the threat of judicial 
subjectivity introduced by Legal Realism, but without relying on the metaphysical 
pretenses that had brought moral and political philosophy into bad repute.”). 
211 My linking of proceduralism and Realism may strike some readers as 
paradoxical: aren’t “proceduralism” and “realism” opposed to one another?  See 
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 206, at 169–72 (“Realism and proceduralism are the 
two great legacies bequeathed by American jurisprudence, and each responds to 
the other in a great spiraling dialectic.”).  The two are opposed only if one defines 
proceduralism more narrowly than I do in this Article.  In the broader sense of 
proceduralism used here, one can easily be a proceduralist and a realist 
simultaneously. 
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While Legal-Process-style ideas continue to exert a fairly strong 
influence in American legal academia,212 it would be a mistake to 
conclude any sketch of the intellectual history of American 
procedural thought with the state of affairs in the 1950s.  
Subsequent developments confirm both the significance of 
procedural thinking and the influence of Legal Realism.  I will limit 
the story to what, for these specific purposes, seem to me the most 
important “sects” of American legal theory:213 the law-and-
economics movement, and the “metaproceduralism” emanating 
from Yale Law School in the 1970s. 
Lawyer-economists generally take procedure quite seriously, in 
their own way.  This, I suggest, follows from the fact that law-and-
economics is—despite Judge Posner’s protestations214—a 
descendant of the instrumentalist strain in Legal Realist thinking.  
Here is an example from the early days of economic analysis of 
law: Guido Calabresi’s efficiency calculus for the costs of accidents 
included “tertiary costs”—the costs of administering different 
accident systems.215  An otherwise inferior accident system might 
be better from the point of view of overall efficiency once one 
                                                     
212 See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory Of Adjudication and The False 
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution And Public Law Models Of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. 
REV. 1273 (1995) (studying the influence of American procedure on academia and 
public policy).  In addition to Legal Process’s continued influence in the civil 
procedure and federal court fields, much influential public law scholarship 
continues to be shaped by arguments of institutional competence, as exemplified 
in the work of scholars such as Cass Sunstein, William Eskridge, Richard Fallon, 
and Adrian Vermeule.  For a longer list of “New Legal Process” scholars in public 
law, see Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1424 n.2 (2011). 
213 Duncan Kennedy explains that legal theory became “sectarianized” in the 
second half of the twentieth century.  See Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of 
Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of the 
Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1032 (2004) 
(describing Critical Legal Studies as “one of the sects of modern legal theory”). 
214 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 3 (1995) (“The law and 
economics movement owes little to legal realism . . . .”).  Brian Leiter provides a 
more convincing account of the relationship between Legal Realism and economic 
analysis of law.  See Brian Leiter, In Praise of Realism (and Against “Nonsense” 
Jurisprudence), 100 GEO. L.J. 865, 871–75 (2012) (“Whatever the chain of influence, it 
seems clear that economic analysis of law, like Legal Realism, is predicated on a 
thoroughgoing skepticism about the adequacy of existing legal categories and the 
need for an alternative explanation of the actual course of decisions.”). 
215 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 28 (1970) (considering the economic and legal costs involved in accident 
law and procedure). 
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considers the cost of administering the alternatives.  So a strict 
liability rule could be preferable to a negligence liability rule, even 
if the strict liability rule would otherwise be less likely to induce 
efficient behavior, because (arguably) a strict liability rule is easier 
and cheaper for courts to administer.216  Economists distinguish 
between the error costs of legal procedure (costs resulting from the 
erroneous decision of a sanction) and the actual costs of litigating 
disputes.217  Moreover, the fact that bringing a lawsuit is costly to 
plaintiffs affects their incentives to bring suit, and must therefore 
be incorporated into any analysis of the deterrent effect of the 
proposed legal rule—and so on.  Lawyer-economists, it is true, 
have tended to focus heavily on the costs of legal procedures,218 
while perhaps underestimating their benefits.219  All the same, 
there is a world of difference betwen law-and-economics 
approaches and the nineteenth-century canonization of substantive 
law.  To restate the point: lawyer-economists must attend to 
procedural realities if they are to remain true to their 
consequentialist foundations. 
“Metaproceduralists,” of course, give the study of procedure 
pride of place.  They, too, derive inspiration from Legal-Realist 
                                                     
216 The literature on the choice of strict liability versus negligence liability 
rules is large, and much of it addresses administrative costs.  On the issue 
mentioned in the text, aggregate administrative costs could in fact be higher under 
strict liability if it results in a higher volume of cases than under a fault-based 
regime.  See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the 
Law of Accidents, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857, 1916 (2004) (“Strict liability is probably 
more expensive to administer than negligence because strict liability requires 
cranking up the liability system for nonnegligent accidents as well as for negligent 
ones, with all the administrative costs that this entails.”). 
217 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 399 (1973) (arguing from an economic 
perspective “that the processes of legal dispute resolution in America are 
dangerously overloaded”). 
218 The tendency to stress the costs of legal adjudication is particularly 
pronounced in scholarship stressing the relative efficiency of social (rather than 
legal) norms.  On the rise of “social norms” in the economic analysis of law, see 
Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
537 (1998).  See also ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
219 For a powerful argument that economic analyses of tort law fail 
sufficiently to consider the collateral consequences of legal procedures, see Scott 
Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV. 67, 68 
(2010) (making the same charge against corrective justice accounts of tort law). 
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premises,220 with a greater emphasis on the skeptical aspects of 
Realist thought.  The Cover-Fiss-Resnik casebook, an emblem of 
metaproceduralism,221 is full of doubts about the capacity for 
existing legal procedures to produce the right answers to social 
and legal problems.  The authors diverged on the implications of 
Realist skepticism and functionalism.222  Robert Cover doubted the 
ability of courts to advance the good life.  Owen Fiss has more faith 
in the ability of legal procedures—in the hands of the right 
judges—to identify, advance, and enforce public values; Judith 
Resnik is more ambivalent about the power and possibilities of 
judicial processes.  What all share, however, is a fierce intellectual 
engagement with questions of procedure. 
5.4. The Continued Dominance of Substantive Law in England 
English law, by contrast, has never had a Realist revolution.  
“[W]hile the instrumentalist revolution in legal thought was taking 
place across the Atlantic, English legal theory hardly moved at 
all.”223  This part of the story is necessarily short—there was no 
fundamental change in the character of English legal thought, and 
no significant advances for procedure from the secondary position 
to which it was relegated at the end of the nineteenth century.  I 
suggest a link between these two non-events; the continued 
“formalism” of English legal thought accounts, in large part, for 
the continued focus on substantive law to the exclusion of 
procedure. 
The emergence of American Legal Realism marks the point of 
departure.  Arnold’s article on substance and procedure contains a 
                                                     
220 See Mullenix, supra note 80, at 1140 (stating that the Cover-Fiss-Resnik 
casebook, PROCEDURE, supra note 53, was “distantly rooted in Dean Roscoe 
Pound’s sociological jurisprudence and the Realist movement of the 1920s and 
1930s”). 
221 Id. 
222 See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 962–73 (“Unlike traditional theory, 
normativism is pessimistic that just results will necessarily flow from good 
procedures, and understands that justice involves a broader social transformation, 
perhaps of the sort where state activity is not appropriate (Cover) or sufficient 
(Fisk and Resnik).”).  Cover, Fiss, and Resnik are, of course, proceduralists under 
my definition.  Note that Eskridge defines “proceduralism” more narrowly as the 
“the notion that good procedures are presumptive evidence of good results.”  Id. 
at 964.  See Section 2, supra. 
223 ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 89, at 257; see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1996). 
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fascinating insight into the difference between England and 
America as the Legal Realist movement took hold in America.  
Casting his eye across the Atlantic to the English legal system, 
Arnold saw “no skeptics undermining its prestige.”224  Indeed, 
American lawyers of the time seemed unanimous in heralding the 
superiority of English judges over their American cousins.  For 
Arnold, this was not because the English judges were actually 
superior, but because English judges had created and maintained a 
purer body of substantive law.  Arnold contended that, since the 
Judicature Acts, English judges had “insulat[ed] . . . the science of 
substantive law from the practical problem of litigation.”225 
Arnold argued that the English judges had maintained the 
appearance of a pristine domain of substantive law by excluding 
procedural questions from that domain.  English law referred 
many procedural matters to a master, thereby removing them from 
the science of law as administered by judges.  Moreover, the “loser-
pays” rule reduced the number of appellate decisions by 
discouraging appeals.  And only a small number of decisions were 
selected for inclusion in the law reports, thereby protecting English 
law from inconvenient decisions that might threaten its logical 
coherence.  The prestige of English judges rested on their ability 
“to keep an ideal from too close contact with reality.”226 
English legal thought was remarkably indifferent to the work 
of the Legal Realists, and instrumental legal theory made relatively 
little ground in the twentieth-century legal academy.  Again, it is 
important to avoid stereotypes when discussing an entire legal 
culture.  English legal scholarship is not entirely devoid of 
instrumentalism or other critical perspectives on law.  A minority 
of legal scholars engage in economic analysis, critical legal studies, 
or literary theory.  But English legal scholars are decidedly not “all 
realists now.”227  Writing in 1996, American legal scholar Robert 
                                                     
224 Arnold, supra note 187, at 637. 
225 Id. at 638. 
226 Id. at 640. 
227 Cf. Yishai Blank, The Reenchantment of Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 633, 640 n.50 
(2011) (noting “the famous, almost cliché saying, ‘we are all realists now.’”).  The 
earliest instance of the saying that I have found is in a review of Llewellyn’s book 
on appellate decision-making.  See Beryl Harold Levy, Book Review, 109 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1045, 1047 (1961) (reviewing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960)) (“we are all Realists now, my friend 
Gellhorn insists, and if it is so, let us bow and bow low to our author”). 
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Gordon noted that “[o]ur most distinctive legal-intellectual 
achievement, legal realism, is classified in British jurisprudence 
texts as an odd minor school of chaps who rather curiously 
supposed law was just what judges do, and do according to 
passing psychological whims, political fancies, or hunches.”228  As 
a general matter, scholarly work in England remains committed to 
an internal perspective on legal doctrine.229  That is particularly 
true in the fields of law to which civil procedure is considered 
“handmaid”—essentially, private law and administrative law. 
The failure of legal instrumentalism to take hold is illustrated 
partly by the the relative rule-formalism of the English lawyer.  To 
a greater extent than Americans, English legal scholars in the 
twentieth century believed, and still believe, that most of what 
judges do is to simply apply settled law to facts.  The sophisticated 
English lawyer will accept that in relatively rare cases the law runs 
out and so the judge is required to fill the gap and make new law.  
H.L.A. Hart expressed the typically English view that American 
legal theory oscillated betweeen the “noble dream” of believing 
that judges had no discretion (Dworkinian or, now, originalist 
constitutional theories) and the “nightmare” of extreme Legal 
Realism.230  To American observers, the English take their judges 
too seriously, and seem naive about the real forces that determine 
the outcomes of cases. 
We need not adjudicate between these contrasting views on the 
forces that actually shape judicial decisions; nor need we 
investigate how much actual differences between American judges 
and English judges account for these differing pictures of 
adjudication.  Our focus here is on the distinction between 
                                                     
228 See Robert W. Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes: A Century of 
Nightmares and Noble Dreams, 84 GEO. L.J. 2215, 2215 (1996) (reviewing NEIL 
DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)).  For an account of the 
post-Realist divergence in Anglo-American legal history scholarship, see Michael 
Lobban, The Varieties of Legal History, 5 CLIO@THÉMIS 11 (2012). 
229 See Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in 
Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295 (2008) (“[In England] as a whole, scholarly work based 
upon black-letter law continues to predominate as it does on the European 
continent.”); Neil Duxbury, When Trying is Failing: Holmes’s “Englishness,” 63 
BROOK. L. REV. 145, 146 (1997) (explaining the “different academic personae” of 
American and English law professors); ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM, supra note 89, at 166 
(noting the “general aversion to theory” across the English legal system). 
230 H.L.A. Hart, The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977), 
reprinted in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123–44 (1983). 
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instrumental visions of law and perspectives that, instead, view 
law as an autonomous discipline.  The English rejection of the idea 
that law should be analyzed in terms of the instrumental goals it 
serves is particularly pronounced in the field of private law.  The 
parallels between the legal thought of Langdell and Peter Birks, the 
most influential private law scholar of recent years, are striking.231  
For a surprising number of scholars—particularly at the elite 
university law schools—the only consideration relevant to a judge 
resolving a private law dispute is the need to provide corrective 
justice between the parties to the lawsuit.  Questions of “policy” 
are quite simply irrelevant: “the class of arguments which a judge 
can use to resolve a case are restricted and exclude public policy 
concerns.”232  To the extent that English scholars of private law 
seek an interdisciplinary perspective on law, they often look to the 
least instrumentally-inclined source imaginable—Kantian moral 
philosophy.  Legal scholars who adhere to a backward-looking, bi-
polar model of legal disputes naturally profess little interest in 
understanding the effect of legal rules on ex ante incentives.  They 
will be relatively unconcerned with the aggregate effects of legal 
rules across a broad range of cases.  And they will understandably 
be less interested in procedure—the body of rules, doctrines, and 
practices that translates substantive law into reality. 
I have suggested that instrumental legal thought leads one to 
give greater prominence to procedure, but the causation may also 
run in the other direction, in a kind of vicious—or virtuous—circle.  
Studying procedure exposes one to the practical imperfections of 
the legal system, to how the realities of practical application fall 
short of the ideal.  In the United States, students and scholars are 
comfortable with the idea that the outcome of a case depends on 
                                                     
231 For a perceptive account of Birksian English private law scholarship from 
an American perspective, see generally Chaim Saiman, Restitution in America: Why 
the U.S. Refuses to Join the Global Restitution Party, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 99 
(2008).  Saiman contends elsewhere that “Birks, a leading figure of Anglo-
Continental private law thought in the late-twentieth century, would have had 
difficulty securing tenure at even a third-tier American law school.”  Chaim 
Saiman, Public Law, Private, and Legal Science, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 691, 696 (2008). 
232 See, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS, TORT AND RIGHTS 308 (2007).  Perhaps the most 
extreme statement of the anti-instrumental viewpoint in the Anglo-
Commonwealth world is Allan Beever & Charles Rickett, Interpretive Legal Theory 
and the Academic Lawyer, 68 MOD. L. REV. 320, 328 (2005) (“Interpretive legal theory 
is nothing more (nor less) than the attempt to understand legal concepts in terms 
of their meaning.”).  For Beever and Rickett, legal scholarship that explains legal 
concepts in policy terms is simply not legal scholarship.  Id. at 335–37. 
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the identity of the decision-maker.  Avoiding procedural questions 
allows English scholars of substantive law to push these 
troublesome questions to one side.  In addition, the institutional 
structure of English legal education helps to keep civil procedure 
off the map for legal scholars; the professions maintain control 
over “vocational” training, removing the need for university law 
schools to teach procedural subjects.233 
English legal scholars, in keeping with their more formal vision 
of law, continue to see procedure simply as the “handmaid” of 
substantive law.234  On this view, the fundamental aim of 
procedure is, to the extent consistent with other goals, to apply the 
law to the facts and produce the correct result dictated.  Even 
England’s most urbane civil procedure scholar, Adrian 
Zuckerman, whose work shows deep familiarity with American 
procedural scholarship, feels able to conceptualize the relationship 
between procedure and substantive law in fairly straightforward 
terms: 
Law enforcement in the context of civil litigation means 
deciding cases by establishing the true facts and correctly 
applying the law to them.  Put differently, the court must 
give the parties what is due to them under the law.  In a 
system governed by the rule of law, the law maker lays 
down the law and the court applies it.235 
American legal scholars necessarily exhibit more complex 
views about the relationship between procedure and substance.  
Post-Realist American theorists have attended to procedural justice 
as a distinct form of justice,236 the site of its own distinct conflicts 
                                                     
233 See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. 
234 ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 89, at 186 (“In the more formal vision of 
law it is simply taken for granted that, other things being equal, the more 
compliance there is with the dictates of formal legal reasoning, the better.”). 
235 Adrian Zuckerman, The Challenge of Civil Justice Reform: Effective Court 
Management of Litigation, 1 CITY U. H.K. L. REV. 49, 53 (2009).  I do not mean to 
suggest that Zuckerman’s own views of the nature of civil procedure are 
undeveloped.  For example, Zuckerman explains that the extent to which the legal 
system should pursue its fundamental objective—getting at the truth—is 
constrained by the limitations of expense and the need to render a speedy 
decision.  Id. at 54–55. 
236 See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004) 
(“[P]rocedural justice is deeply entwined with the old and powerful idea that a 
process that guarantees rights of meaningful participation is an essential 
prerequisite for the legitimate authority of action-guiding legal norms.”). 
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and special choices, rather than as (just) an instrument for the 
enforcement of substantive law.  As an illustration of the degree to 
which Americans intellectualize procedure, Jenny Martinez 
outlines five distinct ways that procedure and substance 
interrelate.237  Another, in an echo of Thurman Arnold, contends 
that “procedure is substantive, and that substance is 
procedural.”238  At the level of legal theory, as well as in the 
curriculum, a stark difference persists between England and 
America. 
A narrowing of the divergence is far from inconceivable.  To 
some extent, the vision of English legal scholarship I have may 
already be outdated; the English legal academy has been 
undergoing rapid change, and “black-letter” scholarship on 
matters of substantive law appears to be declining in prestige.  In 
addition to this trend towards wider perspectives on law, 
institutional and political change may in the future drive English 
legal scholars to think more about procedure.  England may “do 
more” with private litigation, particularly if European plans to 
develop harmonized rules for collective redress—a European form 
of class action—come to fruition.239  If procedure is important 
mainly because of how it allocates power among different actors in 
the civil justice system, then European integration (if the United 
Kingdom participates in it) is likely to increase procedure’s cultural 
prominence.  The process of European integration has already had 
a radical effect on procedure in public law; the ultimate content of 
fundamental rights is now set, at least formally, by a court outside 
the English system—the European Court of Human Rights.  The 
development of federalism within the European Union is likely to 
have an even more disruptive effect on the traditionally unitary 
English civil justice system. 
But systematic thinking about civil procedure is unlikely to 
become widespread until curricular changes allow a critical mass 
of English legal scholars to make it their daily business to write 
about procedural questions and teach them to the next generations 
of lawyers.  The structure of legal education in England may serve 
as an agent of path-dependence; for civil procedure to gain 
                                                     
237 Martinez, supra note 2, at 1031. 
238 Main, supra note 27. 
239 See generally Duncan Fairgrieve & Geraint Howells, Collective Redress 
Procedures—European Debates, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 379 (2009). 
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prominence in England—a prominence the subject surely 
deserves—England will need a change in university legal 
education.  I suggest, however, that such change is unlikely, unless 
we see a deeper change in the way English scholars think about the 
law. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The comparative example of England illuminates American 
proceduralism in civil justice and beyond.  During their training, 
American lawyers learn that procedure is just as worthy of 
intellectual attention as substantive law.  Their English equivalents 
learn the opposite lesson; for them, civil procedure is a body of 
technical rules, not fit for scholarly reflection.  To some extent, 
structural differences in the respective legal systems account for 
this cultural disparity.  More than England, America uses civil 
litigation as an engine of regulation.  Procedure necessarily plays a 
more important role in America because it allocates power to the 
many authorities among whom it is divided.  But the divergence 
between these two common-law countries is even more 
fundamental than that.  The cultural prominence of civil procedure 
reflects a distinctly American urge to transcend the conceptual 
structure of substantive legal doctrine, to understand the purposes 
and effects of law and legal institutions.  If consequences matter, so 
does procedure. 
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